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 Abstract: Social anxiety disorder is the third most common mental disorder with 
the lifetime prevalence rate of 13.3% in the US population. Typically, it causes 
significant impairment in a wide range of functioning and follows a chronic, unremitting 
course if untreated. Over the past two decades, there has been a dramatic increase in 
clinical research aimed at examining underlying mechanisms maintaining social anxiety. 
One line of research has investigated attentional biases in social anxiety, using various 
cognitive experiment paradigms, including the emotional Stroop and the modified dot-
probe tasks. However, overall findings are equivocal about the nature of attentional 
biases in social anxiety and several methodological problems limit the interpretability of 
the data. The present study examined attentional biases associated with social anxiety 
using a new research paradigm in the field of anxiety disorders: the inattentional 
blindness paradigm. This paradigm presents a social cue in the absence of the subjects’ 




more purely attentional aspect of information processing to be examined reducing the 
influence of potential response biases or effortful strategies. Two independent 
experiments were conducted using nonclinical student samples consisting of individuals 
high in social anxiety (HSAs) versus individuals low in social anxiety (LSAs) based on 
the static and sustained inattentional blindness tasks. Overall, results revealed that HSAs 
were more likely to detect or identify a socially-threatening cue, relative to LSAs; 
whereas LSAs were more likely to detect or identify a non-threatening social cue, relative 
to HSAs. These findings were observed only in the presence of a bogus-speech 
manipulation. These data suggest the promising utility of the inattentional blindness 
paradigm in investigating attentional biases in social anxiety and perhaps other 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Overview of Social Anxiety Disorder 
 Until as recent as 20 years ago, social phobia, also known as social anxiety 
disorder (SAD), had not been the focus of clinical research. In 1985, Liebowitz, Gorman, 
Fyer, and Klein titled their article “Social Phobia: Review of a Neglected Anxiety 
Disorder”. It was only two decades ago that this condition gained a formal diagnosable 
title in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder system (DSM-III; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1980). However, various descriptions related to fears 
and anxieties in social situations have existed throughout history.  For instance, 
“Ereutophobia”, invented by a German psychiatrist, J. Casper (as cited by Himmelhoch, 
Levine, & Gershon, 2001), was widely used in the 19th century to describe patients 
displaying social inhibition due to their fear of criticism or humiliation (1902). The 
modern definition of social phobia as a condition encompassing an excessive 
performance fear in response to the possible scrutiny of others first appeared in the 1960s 
(Marks & Gelder, 1966).  
 With a lifetime prevalence of approximately 15%, SAD currently ranks as the 
third most common mental disorder in the United States (Kessler et al., 1994). SAD is no 
longer the neglected child of anxiety disorders. During the past two decades, we have 





1.1.1. DSM-IV Definition and Clinical Features 
 The central feature of SAD is a marked and persistent fear of social/performance 
situations in which embarrassment or humiliation may occur (DSM-IV; APA, 1994). 
Individuals with SAD are excessively concerned about being negatively evaluated as 
anxious, weak, incompetent, “crazy”, or stupid. Typically, feared social situations cause a 
wide array of anxiety symptoms (e.g., palpitations, tremors, sweating, gastrointestinal 
discomfort, diarrhea, muscle tension, blushing, confusion, etc.). Individuals with SAD 
may dread one or two relatively specific social/performance situations such as speaking, 
writing, or playing a musical instrument in public (i.e., social phobia, non-generalized). 
However, most victims of SAD fear multiple social/performance situations (Holt, 
Heimberg, Hope, & Liebowitz, 1992; Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Keys, 1986). DSM-IV 
classifies SAD with multiple social fears as the “generalized” subtype. 
 Data from the U.S. National Comorbidity Survey (NCS; Kessler et al., 1994) 
revealed that the lifetime prevalence rate of SAD is 13.3% based on DSM-III-R, which 
was exceeded only by depression and alcoholism among mental disorders. SAD has also 
been found to be more prevalent in young people. One study using a young adult sample 
(mean = 18 yrs) revealed that 23% of them met the criteria for both SAD and simple 
phobia, with approximately half meeting the criteria for SAD only (Reinherz, Giaconia, 
Lefkowitz, Pakiz, & Frost, 1993). Furthermore, it may be that the prevalence of SAD has 
been underestimated because its sufferers are likely to withdraw from social interaction 
and thus unwilling to consult their family doctor (den Boer, 2000). Relatedly, one French 




psychological problems unless it was accompanied by depression (Weiller, Bisserbe, 
Boyer, Lepine, & Lecrubier, 1996). The Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) study 
also found that only 3 of 98 individuals with SAD openly sought help for this problem 
(Davidson, Hughes, George, & Blazer, 1993).  
Moreover, the prevalence of SAD seems to be on the rise. A follow-up 
examination of the NCS data demonstrated a robust cohort effect based on synthetic 
estimates of retrospectively reported onset ages of SAD (Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, 
McGonagle, & Kessler, 1996). Lifetime prevalence rates of SAD were higher among 
younger individuals (ages 15-24 = 14.9%; ages 25-34 = 13.8%), relative to older 
individuals (ages 35-44 = 12.1%; ages 45-54 = 12.2%). A more recent follow-up analysis 
revealed that the cohort effect observed from the NCS data was largely due to the 
increasing lifetime prevalence of SAD characterized by one or more non-speaking fears 
(Heimberg, Stein, Hiripi, & Kessler, 2000), which resembles the DSM-IV generalized 
subtype. This is consistent with the findings that generalized SAD is a more severe form 
of the condition characterized by being more impairing, persistent, highly comorbid with 
other disorders, compared to SAD exclusively with public speaking fears (Kessler, Stein, 
& Berglund, 1998). No cohort effect has been found in the subtype exclusively with 
speaking fears. Overall, these data suggest that SAD is becoming a greater challenge to 
clinicians and society. 
SAD is also likely to co-occurs with numerous mental disorders, including 
depression, other anxiety disorders, and substance use disorders, and it typically precedes 




1995; Magee et al., 1996; Sanderson, Dinardo, Rapee, & Barlow, 1990; Schneier, 
Johnson, Hornig, Liebowitz, & Weissman, 1992). The ECA study revealed that 69% of 
individuals with SAD exhibited comorbid DSM-III disorders (Schneier, Johnson et al., 
1992): simple phobia (59%), agoraphobia (45%), alcohol abuse (19%), and major 
depression (17%). Similarly, in the NCS, 81% of individuals with SAD displayed 
additional DSM-III-R(APA, 1987) disorders: simple phobia (37.6%), major depression 
(37.2%), alcohol dependence (23.9%), and agoraphobia (23.3%). A more recent study 
based on DSM-IV also demonstrated that 51% of 141 patients with SAD were given 
additional diagnoses (Erwin, Heimberg, Juster, & Mindlin, 2002): generalized anxiety 
disorder (GAD; 23.4%), specific phobia (12.8%), and major depressive disorder (12.8%). 
Moreover, the data showed that the presence of comorbid mental disorders placed 
individuals with SAD at greater risk of experiencing several negative outcomes such as 
increased suicidal attempts and greater utilization of mental health service (Schneier, 
Johnson et al., 1992). 
1.1.2. Costs of the Problem 
 Many other aspects of SAD also illuminate the gravity of the illness. SAD is 
typically associated with significant impairment in functioning (Schneier, Johnson et al., 
1992). One study revealed that 50% of individuals in their early 30s with SAD had never 
married, compared to 36% of individuals with panic disorder and agoraphobia and 18% 
of individuals with GAD (Sanderson et al., 1990). The vast majority of individuals with 
SAD tend to perceive their careers, academic lives, and social functions to be severely 




et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1986). Not surprisingly, SAD is associated with marked 
reduction in quality of life (Stein & Kean, 2000). Increased rates of suicidal ideation was 
also observed in connection with this condition (Katzelnick et al., 2001; Schneier, 
Johnson et al., 1992). SAD was also associated with diminished educational and 
occupational attainment (Davidson, Hughes, George, & Blazer, 1994; Katzelnick et al., 
2001), and poor socio-economic status, employment rates, and household income (Patel, 
Knapp, Henderson, & Baldwin, 2002).  Relatedly, SAD is also characterized by an early 
age of onset and its victims typically undergo a chronic and unremitting course (Reich, 
Goldenberg, Goisman, Vasile, & Keller, 1994; Reich, Goldenberg, Vasile, Goisman, & 
Keller, 1994; Schneier, Johnson et al., 1992).  
 Some studies estimated more direct costs of SAD. In general, anxiety disorders 
result in staggering financial costs. Based on the NCS data, the total costs of anxiety 
disorders in 1998 were estimated to be 63.1 billion dollars, which included medical and 
psychiatric treatment costs, indirect workplace cost, and mortality costs (Greenberg et al., 
1999). Of them, workplace cost was most strongly linked to SAD. Other studies also 
revealed that SAD is associated with increased health care seeking. Compared to 
individuals with no diagnoses, those with generalized SAD displayed a greater number of 
annual outpatient visits and a greater total medical expenditures (Katzelnick et al., 2001). 
Individuals with SAD also displayed higher levels of drug dependency and use of health 
services than those with no psychiatric morbidity (Patel et al., 2002). 
 In summary, with the vigorous research on the nature, epidemiology, and 




changed. SAD is considered a highly prevalent, debilitating illness with an early age of 
onset, a chronic course, and huge costs to both the affected individuals and the society. 
1.2. Current Models of SAD 
1.2.1. Cognitive-Behavioral Approaches 
 On the basis of the foundational formulation that misperceived threat leads to 
pathological anxiety (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985), several authors have formulated 
cognitive-behavioral accounts of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
Given the similarities of the Clark and Wells’ and Rapee and Heimberg’s models, this 
next section summarizes the major theoretical components shared by both models along 
with some differences between them. 
First, both models postulate the presence of dysfunctional assumptions (about 
oneself and social situation) originating from early experience, and their role in fostering 
negative social misinterpretations. For instance, Clark (2001) presented three major 
categories of dysfunctional assumptions: (a) excessively high standards for social 
performance, (b) conditional beliefs regarding the consequences of performing in a 
certain way, and (c) unconditional negative beliefs about the self. Rapee and Heimberg’s 
model also states that excessive threat appraisals of social situations may be fostered by 
early experiences, including upbringing by overprotective/overintrusive parents (Rapee, 
1997), dysfunctional modeling of over-emphasizing the importance of other people’s 
opinions (Bruch & Heimberg, 1994), or the parents’ promoting social avoidance (Barrett, 
Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan, 1996; Bruch & Heimberg, 1994; Dadds, Barrett, Rapee, & Ryan, 




found that patients with SAD were likely to more negatively interpret an ambiguous 
social event relevant to the self, relative to patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD) or healthy controls. Stopa and Clark (2000) also found that patients with 
generalized SAD interpreted social events (but not non-social events) more negatively 
compared to patients with other anxiety disorders or non-patient controls. 
 Second, biased attentional processing is considered to make a central contribution 
to maintaining social anxiety. Both models propose that individuals with SAD are likely 
to attend to internal (=mental) processes when entering social-evaluative situations. In 
such situations, they shift the focus of attention to internal information (e.g., thoughts, 
images, memories, physiological reactions, etc.) and utilize this self-generated negative 
information to infer how they appear to others or how they will be evaluated (Clark & 
Wells, 1995). Clark (2001) suggested that the inwardly-oriented attention generate self-
confirmatory evidence of misinterpreted social interaction and blocks the access to 
external disconfirming social information. Rapee and Heimberg (1998) also proposed 
that social phobics pay attention to mental representation of the self, on which they base 
their judgment as to how others would evaluate them. Some supporting evidence exists. 
Patients with SAD were found to display higher levels of self-focused attention than 
patients with other anxiety disorders and non-patients (Mellings & Alden, 2000). Woody 
(1996) also found that an experimental manipulation of increasing self-focused attention 
during a speech task led to an increase of anxiety in patients with generalized SAD.  
Third, both models also propose that social phobics display biased attentional 




social phobics display “rapid and extensive allocation of attentional resources” to the 
detection of negative evaluative threat, which is in line with the general pattern of 
attentional processing in anxiety disorders. In contrast, Clark and Wells (1995) propose 
that social phobic’s attentional processing of external environments is reduced due to 
self-focused attention. However, both models concur that (hypervigilant or reduced) 
processing of external social cues is negatively biased. Some studies have provided 
support for negatively biased processing of external social cues. Veljaca and Rapee 
(1998) demonstrated that relative to those low in social anxiety, those high in social 
anxiety were better at detecting negative audience reactions (e.g., yawing, looking at 
watch, coughing) than positive audience behaviors (e.g., leaning forward, smiling, 
nodding). Other authors have shown that social phobics were faster in detecting angry 
faces than happy faces in a crowd of neutral faces using a face-in-the-crowd paradigm 
(Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999). Furthermore, a number of studies using 
cognitive experimental paradigms (e.g., emotional Stroop tests, dot-probe tasks) have 
revealed that social anxiety is associated with hypervigilant/selective attention to social 
threat cues (See Chapter 2). 
 Fourth, both models suggest that social phobics process the self as a social object, 
thereby forming images or mental representation in which they see themselves as if 
viewed from an observer’s perspective. One study found that spontaneous imagery 
reported by the majority (77%) of patients with SAD was characterized by negative, 
observer-perspective images, whereas only 10% of nonclinical controls reported such 




 Fifth, both models also emphasize safety behaviors as a crucial maintenance 
factor of SAD. Safety behaviors aimed at avoiding potential source of negative 
evaluation/humiliation could range from very subtle internal mental processes (e.g., 
cognitive rehearsal prior to a public speech) to active avoidance of social situations 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Wells et al., 1995). Typically, social 
phobics engage in numerous safety behaviors when they enter or anticipate social 
situations. The deleterious effects of safety behaviors have been well documented (Clark, 
2001; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997): (a) they may paradoxically 
generate the feared symptoms (e.g., keeping one’s arm to the side makes one sweat more), 
(b) they increase self-focused attention thereby intensifying the salience of one’s negative 
self-image, (c) some safety behaviors even more actively draw other people’s attention to 
the patient (e.g., covering one’s blushed face makes others look into one’s face), and (d) 
they influence other people such that the patient’s fears are partly confirmed (e.g., 
unnatural safety behaviors make them appear aloof and cold in social interactions and 
reduce their attention to other people, leading to unfavorable social feedback). The two 
models also propose that the chronic use of safety behaviors may result in social skills 
deficits. Some studies provide support for the role of safety behavior in SAD. Socially 
anxious individuals were found to use more safety behaviors and elicit more negative 
reactions from others when anticipating negative social feedback (Alden & Bieling, 
1998). Moreover, some authors reported that eliminating safety behaviors enhanced the 




 In summary, the two cognitive-behavioral models provide detailed accounts of 
how individuals maintain/intensify excessive social fears in a vicious feedback loop. In 
particular, information processing biases, including excessive self-focused attention and 
biased attentional processing of external social cues, are thought to play a central role in 
the maintenance of SAD.   
1.2.2. Biological/Pharmacological Approaches 
 Various methodologies have been adopted to investigate the genetic and 
neurobiological features of SAD.  
1.2.2.1. Twin and Family Studies 
Data from family and twin studies have shown a modest but significant genetic 
contribution in the development of SAD. Early family studies reported an approximately 
three times higher risk of SAD in relatives of probands with SAD compared to relatives 
of healthy controls (e.g., Fyer, 1993). A follow-up study also revealed an escalated risk of 
developing SAD in close family members of probands with SAD (Fyer, Mannuzza, 
Chapman, Martin, & Klein, 1995). One study found that 23% of the children of adults 
with SAD also met criteria for SAD (Mancini, VanAmeringen, Szatmari, Fugere, & 
Boyle, 1996).  
Heritability estimates based on twin studies tend to fall in the moderate range. 
Heritability for SAD was estimated as .31 on the basis of 2163 personally interviewed 
female twins (Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, 1992). More recently, Kendler 
and colleagues provided a higher heritability estimate of SAD (= .51), correcting for 




Karkowski, & Prescott, 1999). A recent meta-analysis of twin studies reported a 
heritability estimate of .65 (Beatty, Heisel, Hall, Levine, & La France, 2002). Overall, 
these data indicate a mild to moderate genetic contribution to the development of social 
anxiety. However, Hofmann and Barlow (2002) pointed out that the genetic disposition 
leading to social anxiety may be nonspecific and shared with other anxiety disorders. 
Relatedly, it is yet to be clarified how the genotype determines the behavioral phenotype 
(Rapee & Spence, 2004). 
1.2.2.2. Neurotransmitter system 
 Another line of research has investigated the role of anomalous neurotransmitter 
functions in social anxiety, particularly serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine, or 5-HT). The 
role of serotonergic function in social anxiety was suggested by the effectiveness of 
serotonin-selective reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) in treating this condition. Presently, 
Paroxetine (brand name: Paxil) and Sertraline (Zoloft) are FDA-approved drugs for the 
treatment of SAD. Various studies have demonstrated the efficacy of SSRIs in treating 
social anxiety (Katzelnick et al., 1995; Schneier, Chin, Hollander, & Liebowitz, 1992; 
Stein et al., 1998). There also exists some limited evidence suggesting that a disturbance 
in noradrenergic and dopaminergic functions is associated with social anxiety (for a 
review, see den Boer, 2000).  
1.2.2.3. Neuroimaging Studies 
 Neuroimaging approaches have also helped understand the neurobiological 
features of social anxiety. Recently, based on a single photon emission computed 




striatal dopaminergic system in social phobics (Tiihonen et al., 1997). Specifically, 
striatal dopamine reuptake site densities were markedly lower in social phobics than in 
controls. These data suggest that dopamine reuptake inhibitors may be beneficial to social 
phobics (den Boer, 2000). Using positron emission tomography (PET), Tillfors and 
colleagues (2001) demonstrated that when challenged with a speech task, social phobics 
showed enhanced regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) in the amygdaloid complex, , 
whereas non-phobic subjects exhibited an increase in cortical perfusion during the speech 
challenge. These data were interpreted as suggesting a linkage between social anxiety and 
phylogenetically older subcortical danger-recognition system (Tillfors et al., 2001). 
Tillfors and colleagues’ follow-up study sought to further examine the neural correlates 
of social anxiety evoked by anticipating a public speech (Tillfors, Furmark, 
Marteinsdottir, & Fredrikson, 2002). They found that the induced speech anxiety was 
accompanied by enhanced cerebral blood flow in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
left inferior temporal cortex, and in the left amygdaloid-hippocampal region. These 
findings led to a speculation that social anxiety is linked to a neural network 
encompassing the amygdaloid-hippocampal region, prefrontal, and temporal areas 
(Tillfors et al., 2002).  
1.2.2.4. Summary 
 In summary, various research methodologies have been adopted to illuminate the 
genetic and biological features of SAD. Overall, these data have demonstrated the genetic 
contribution and neurobiological dysfunctions linked to social anxiety. However, the 




CHAPTER 2: ATTENTIONAL BIASES IN SOCIAL ANXIETY 
 
2.1. Overview of Attentional Biases in SAD 
 Information processing biases associated with social anxiety have been addressed 
in several domains, including attention, memory, interpretation and judgment (Heinrichs 
& Hofmann, 2001). Particularly, a number of researchers have examined attentional 
biases as a potential maintenance factor of social anxiety. As reviewed in the previous 
chapter, attentional biases (e.g., hypervigilance, self-focused attention) constitute the 
central feature of cognitive-behavioral models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). Several experimental paradigms have been employed to illuminate the 
nature of attentional biases involved in social anxiety.  
Investigations of biased attention in social anxiety have varied along several 
dimensions including: (a) the paradigm used for assessing attentional bias (e.g., 
emotional Stroop task vs. dot-probe paradigm); (b) the nature of socially threatening cues 
(e.g., threatening words vs. threatening faces); (c) clinical status of the subjects studied 
(i.e., individuals meeting threshold diagnoses for SAD vs. non-clinical samples scoring 
high or low in social anxiety); and (d) whether a social anxiety induction manipulation 
was included prior to the assessment of attentional biases. 
Overall, they have yielded a mixed pattern of findings (Heinrichs & Hofmann, 
2001): (a) hypervigilance (i.e., an attentional bias towards threatening information), (b) 
avoidance (i.e., cognitive avoidance of deep processing of threatening stimuli), (c) 




by avoidance in the later stages), and (d) specificity (the bias occurs only if the threat 
corresponds to the core of anxiety disorder). The present chapter is devoted to reviewing 
relevant findings according to each experiment paradigm.  
2.2. Existing Experiment Paradigms  
2.2.1. Emotional Stroop Test 
The original Stroop color-naming test (Stroop, 1935) presents a series of colored 
words to subjects and asks them to name the color of the words as rapidly as possible 
(while ignoring their meaning). Mismatch between the color and content of the word (e.g., 
the word “green” printed in red) typically results in a longer response latency, which has 
been typically regarded as evidence of cognitive interference. Modified versions of 
Stroop tests presenting emotional threat words have been used to examine attentional 
biases in numerous conditions, including depression (Klieger & Cordner, 1990; Segal, 
Truchon, Gemar, & Guirguis, 1995; Segal & Vella, 1990), panic disorder (McNally et al., 
1994; McNally, Riemann, & Kim, 1990; McNally, Riemann, Louro, Lukach, & Kim, 
1992), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Foa, Ilai, McCarthy, Shoyer, & Murdock, 1993; 
Lavy, Vanoppen, & Vandenhout, 1994), posttraumatic stress disorder (Foa, Feske, 
Murdock, Kozak, & Mccarthy, 1991; Kaspi, McNally, & Amir, 1995; McNally, English, 
& Lipke, 1993), specific phobia (Lavy, Vandenhout, & Arntz, 1993; Mathews & 
Sebastian, 1993), and SAD (Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001; Hope, Rapee, 
Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Lundh & Ost, 1996; Maidenberg, Chen, Craske, Bohn, & 
Bystritsky, 1996; Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993; McNeil et al., 1995; Spector, 




response latencies to threat words in contrast with non-threat words have been deemed to 
indicate selective attention towards the threat.  
Given the central role of attentional bias in cognitive models of SAD, it is not 
surprising that the emotional Stroop paradigm has been extensively applied to investigate 
this condition. One of the earliest studies using social threat words (e.g., failure and 
pathetic), physical threat words (e.g., disease and cancer), and neutral words (e.g., secure 
and holiday) found that all anxious patients displayed longer latencies in naming the 
color of social threat words, but only physical worriers displayed longer latencies for 
physical threat words (Mathews & Macleod, 1985).  
Becker and colleagues (2001) compared 32 patients with GAD, 29 patients with 
SAD, and 31 non-anxious controls, presenting GAD-related words (e.g., illness, injury, 
debts, nervous, death, heartbeat, unemployed, failure, abandoned), social anxiety-related 
words (e.g., talk, stutter, embarrassment, blush, watched, audience, silence, criticize, 
dislike, clumsy, ridicule, shy), neutral words (e.g., chair, umbrella, solid, walk, potato), 
and positive words (e.g., baby, dreaming, flower, gift, marry, sunset, kiss, victory). They 
found that SAD patients displayed longer latencies specifically to social threat words, 
whereas GAD patients displayed longer latencies to all types of emotional words (Becker 
et al., 2001; Hope et al., 1990). McNeil and colleagues (1995) compared patients with 
circumscribed speech phobia, generalized SAD, and generalized SAD with avoidant 
personality disorder using an emotional Stroop test. They found that the two generalized 
SAD groups displayed longer latencies in response to threat words implying generalized 




phobia group. In contrast, speech-related words elicited delayed response across all 
groups (McNeil et al., 1995). A more recent study comparing patients with generalized 
SAD with nonanxious controls provided findings consistent with the specificity 
hypothesis (Spector et al., 2003). Patients with SAD displayed longer latencies to social 
threat words related to negative evaluation (e.g., criticize) or noticeable anxiety 
symptoms (e.g., blushing), but not to words denoting less observable symptoms by others 
(e.g., palpitations). The observed response latencies were also significantly associated 
with scores on self-report measures of social anxiety (Spector et al., 2003).  
In contrast, in Amir and colleagues’ study (1996), patients with DSM-III-R SAD 
displayed shorter latencies to social threat words relative to physical threat words when 
expecting to give a speech; whereas they exhibited longer latencies to social threat words 
under the no-anxiety induction condition. The authors suggested that the emotional 
Stroop effect was suppressed in the high anxiety context. 
In summary, the emotional Stroop paradigm has been extensively used to examine 
attentional biases associated with SAD. Most studies using the Stroop paradigm have 
shown that individuals with heightened social anxiety or SAD display longer color-
naming latencies in response to social threat words (e.g., Andersson, Westoo, & 
Johansson, 2006; Spector, Pecknold, & Libman, 2003; Amir, Freshman, & Foa, 2002; 
Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001; McNeil et al., 1995; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & 
Dombeck, 1990; Lundh & Ost, 1996; Maidenberg, Chen, Craske, Bohn, & Bystritsky, 
1996; Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993) with very few exceptions that have revealed no 




However, as pointed out by Bogels and Mansell (2004), the specificity is questionable 
given some data indicating that other groups of patients also show delayed response to 
social threat words (e.g., Becker et al., 2001; Mathews & Macleod, 1985).  
2.2.2. Modified Dot-probe Test 
2.2.2.1. Modified Dot-probe Test based on Word Stimuli 
 A typical modified dot-probe task proceeds as follows: (a) the subject is instructed 
to fixate a small central cue presented for about 500ms to 1000ms on a computer monitor, 
(b) the fixation cue is replaced by a pair of stimuli (either words or pictures) presented 
with one above and the other below the central point for about 500ms, (c) immediately 
after their offset, a small dot appears in either of the two stimuli positions, and (d) the 
subject’s task is to hit either an upper or bottom response key as rapidly as possible to 
indicate the position of the probe (i.e., dot). For instance, the screen may display a threat 
word “ridiculed” paired with a neutral word “navigated”, on one of which position the 
probe appears very shortly. Thus, a faster detection of the dot is considered to indicate 
that the subject’s initial attention was oriented toward the location of the stimulus where 
the probe appeared afterwards. 
Bogels and Mansell (2004) have outlined several methodological advantages of 
the dot-probe paradigm over the Stroop: (a) true selective attention can be examined via 
the simultaneous presentation of threat and distracter items, (b) the reliance on the 
meaningless detection cue (i.e., a dot) renders mental preoccupation unlikely to affect the 
reaction time, and (c) both hypervigilance and avoidance can be indexed in the same 




mixed, suggesting attentional hypervigilance (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Musa, Lepine, 
Clark, Mansell, & Ehlers, 2003; Mogg, Philippot, & Bradley, 2004; Sposari & Rapee, 
2007), attentional avoidance (e.g., Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999; Chen, Ehlers, 
Clark, & Mansell, 2002), difficulty in attentional disengagement (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, 
& Przeworski, 2003) or no evidence of attentional bias linked to social anxiety (e.g., 
Horenstein & Segui, 1997; Mansell, Ehlers, Clark, & Chen, 2002). 
Asmundson and Stein (1994) compared 24 patients with generalized SAD with 20 
healthy controls using a modified dot-probe task. They found that patients with SAD 
responded faster to probes that appeared on the position of social threat words, relative to 
neutral or physical threat words (Asmundson & Stein, 1994). However, this result 
occurred only when threat words were presented in the upper area of the screen, which 
was likely to receive initial attention. It suggests that an attentional shift did not occur 
towards threat words presented at the bottom. Similarly, Horenstein and Segui (1997) 
compared patients with SAD, patients with panic disorder, and healthy controls, and 
found that patients with panic disorder were faster in detecting dots preceded by physical 
threat words only in the upper area of the screen. This study also failed to provide 
evidence of attentional bias in patients with SAD (Horenstein & Segui, 1997).  
Amir and colleagues (2003) found that compared to healthy controls, patients 
with SAD displayed slower reactions when a social threat word preceded the probe in the 
opposite location. The authors suggested that individuals with SAD may have difficulty 
disengaging their attention from socially threatening material (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & 




anxiety using a dot-probe task with or without leading them to anticipate giving a speech. 
Results revealed that individuals high in social anxiety displayed no attentional bias 
towards or away from social-evaluative words. In contrast, trait anxiety was associated 
with selective attention to negative relative to positive social threat words. The speech 
threat did not interact with social anxiety (Mansell, Ehlers, Clark, & Chen, 2002). 
 Overall, data derived from modified dot-probe tasks using threat words are quite 
equivocal, only tentatively supporting the presence of attentional bias associated with 
social anxiety. Some methodological problems have been indicated. First, most studies 
did not address the issue of comorbidity (Bogels & Mansell, 2004; Heinrichs & Hofmann, 
2001). A recent study demonstrated that social phobics with comorbid depression 
responded like non-patient controls, whereas patients with SAD only displayed an 
attentional bias towards social threat words. This suggests the possibility that comorbid 
depression may significantly attenuate SAD patients’ hypervigilance toward social threat 
cues (Musa, Lepine, Clark, Mansell, & Ehlers, 2003). It is not clear whether this may be 
true of all attentional bias investigations. Second, the specific words pools generally 
differ from study to study (Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001), which makes the findings 
incomparable. Relatedly, some threat words did not seem to tap the core concern of the 
targeted emotional disorder being investigated. Those with SAD may respond to 
“incompetent” or “criticized” and those with panic disorder may respond to 
“ suffocating” or “collapse”, whereas both groups may respond to “humiliation” or 





2.2.2.2. Modified Dot-probe Test based on Facial Stimuli 
 In contrast, modified dot-probe tests using emotional faces seem to have yielded 
more promising results. Mansell and colleagues (1999) compared individuals high vs. 
low in social anxiety using a modified dot-probe task, in which they were presented with 
pairs of pictures comprised of a face (positive, neutral, or negative) and a household 
object (e.g., a fan, a clock, a rope, etc) for 500 ms under the condition of social threat or 
no threat. Results revealed that relative to those low in social anxiety, those high in social 
anxiety exhibited an attentional avoidance from emotional faces (i.e., negative and 
positive) only in the presence of social threat (Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999).  
Another pattern of findings was provided by the same research group (Chen, 
Ehlers, Clark, & Mansell, 2002). Twenty patients with SAD diverted their attention from 
any type of faces (i.e., positive, neutral, or negative) to household objects presented for 
500ms. Non-anxious controls did not display attentional avoidance from faces. This study 
did not use a social threat induction procedure. Recently, Sposari and Rapee (2007) 
attempted to replicate Chen et al. (2002) study including a bogus-speech manipulation 
procedure. Interestingly, the addition of the bogus-speech manipulation led them to 
observe hypervigilant attentional processing towards (any) faces among patients with 
SAD compared to normal controls.  
There are also some data suggesting that the pattern of dot-probe paradigm 
findings may vary as a function of the length of stimuli duration (Mogg, Philippot, & 
Bradley, 2004; Cooper & Langton, 2006). Mogg, Philippot, and Bradley (2004) 




which happy-neutral and angry-neutral face pairs are displayed for either 500ms or 
1250ms. At 500ms, the SAD group showed hypervigilance to angry faces, relative to 
happy and neutral faces, in comparison with the control group. In contrast, at 1,250ms, 
this effect disappeared. Similarly, Cooper and Langton (2006) with a normal student 
sample found evidence for attentional hypervigilant towards threatening social cues for 
the stimulus duration of 100ms. However, this pattern was revered by 500ms. 
 Overall, the modified dot-probe paradigm has been more successful in detecting 
attentional bias in social anxiety when social threat was presented as emotional faces as 
opposed to threat words. Nevertheless, even with the picture stimuli consisting of 
emotional faces, findings are quite inconsistent. Cooper and Langton (2006) pointed out 
that dot-probe data could be interested in at least three ways: (a) vigilance towards one 
particular stimulus, (b) inhibition of the other pair, or (c) both. Further investigation is 
required to understand the precise nature of mechanisms involved in the modified dot-
probe paradigm leading to differential speed of dot-detection. It seems also important to 
examine underlying differences in attentional processing of words and pictures in the 
context of the dot-probe paradigm. Clark and Wells (2005) hypothesized that face-
processing studies measure attention to actual social cues, whereas word-processing 
studies reflect mental preoccupation.  
2.2.3. Other Paradigms 
 Visual search paradigms provide a context in which selective attention can be 
indexed by faster detection of the target social threat or slower detection of a target 




studies demonstrated enhanced social threat detection in individuals with social anxiety 
(disorder). For instance, based on the face-in-the-crowd visual search paradigm, one 
study compared patients with generalized SAD with nonanxious controls with respect to 
the detection speed of an angry, happy, disgust, or neutral face in a crowd of 12 
distracters photographs (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999). Relative to normal controls, 
social phobics displayed faster detection of angry as opposed to happy faces out of a 
neutral crowd. However, another study using schematic faces found that all subjects 
detected an angry face among happy faces faster with fewer errors, relative to a happy 
face among angry faces, regardless of the levels of their social anxiety (Esteves, 1999). 
Thus, the observed bias was not specifically linked to social anxiety.  
A more recent study compared 35 patients with generalized SAD, 27 patients with 
major depression, and 55 healthy controls to examine memory and attentional biases, 
using a visual search task based on word stimuli as part of the study tasks (Rinck & 
Becker, 2005). In this task, subjects were shown a single probe word in the screen, which 
was replaced by a matrix of words immediately upon the keyboard input. Their task was 
to indicate the presence of the probe word in the matrix by pressing a key corresponding 
to “yes” or “no” as promptly as possible. Each word matrix consisted of three rows of 
three words from the same type (i.e., either depression-related, neutral, positive, or social 
anxiety-related), and the probe word also varied among the four types. Those with 
generalized SAD took longer to detect probe words embedded in the social anxiety words 
matrices, relative to the other three distracter matrices. In contrast, no enhancement effect 




results emerged for those with depression in responding to depression-related words 
(Rinck & Becker, 2005).  
 Taken together, data derived from the visual search paradigms have provided 
some evidence of hypervigilance toward social threat cues associated with social anxiety. 
However, overall findings are equivocal. Moreover, this paradigm may be unfit for 
examining attentional avoidance due to explicit instructions to search for the target 
(Bogels & Mansell, 2004; Rinck & Becker, 2005). 
Recently, a few studies have used saccadic eye movement tracking devices to 
examine attentional bias in social anxiety (Garner, Rutherford, Baldwin, Bradley, & 
Mogg, 2005; Horley, Williams, Gonsalvez, & Gordon, 2003, 2004). Healthy individuals 
were found to focus mainly on the eyes, nose, and mouth, which form an inverted triangle 
in shape (Mertens, Siegmund, & Grusser, 1993; Walkersmith, Gale, & Findlay, 1977). 
Horley and colleagues (2004) argued that eye movement patterns provide more direct 
indices of selective attention to facial stimuli, whereas cognitive tasks provide only 
indirect measures. In their earlier study, 15 patients with generalized SAD and 15 healthy 
controls were compared with respect to visual scan paths in response to neutral, happy 
and frowning face stimuli, using a computerized infrared eye gaze monitoring system. 
Results revealed that social phobics displayed a distinctive hyperscanning of faces 
(suggestive of hypervigilance), characterized by a lack of fixations (both in number and 
duration) and a markedly increased raw scan path length. The hypervigilant pattern of 
facial scanning was more prominent for frowning and neutral faces, relative to happy 




mouth), and such avoidance from the eyes was more conspicuous in the case of sad faces 
(Horley et al., 2003). Their follow-up study compared 22 subjects with generalized SAD 
with 22 healthy controls using a specifically threat-related facial expression (i.e., anger), 
in comparison with sad, happy, and neutral expressions (Horley et al., 2004). Results 
revealed that social phobics showed hyperscanning (increased scanpath length) and 
avoidance (reduced foveal fixations) of the eye, particularly in the case of angry faces. 
They suggested that the observed disturbance is likely to be part of a defensive strategy 
aimed at avoiding negative evaluation (Horley et al., 2004). Another recent study 
compared individuals high vs. low in social anxiety with respect to their eye movements 
to pictures of faces and objects (Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006). Under social threat 
conditions, those high in social anxiety were faster to fixate on emotional faces than 
neutral faces, relative to those low in social anxiety. However, despite the initial prompt 
orienting towards emotional faces, those high in social anxiety maintained shorter gaze 
on them, relative to those low in social anxiety. Overall, this pattern of findings is 
consistent with a hypervigilance-avoidance account. 
 The research based on eye-movement patterns merits further investigations. It has 
demonstrated both attentional vigilance and avoidance related to social anxiety in the 
same paradigm. Particularly, Garner and colleagues (2006)’ findings suggest that the two 
modes of attentional biases may be sequentially evident such that initial hypervigilance is 







 A variety of methods have been used to investigate the nature of attentional biases 
associated with social anxiety. Although overall findings are mixed, some tentative 
conclusions and considerations for future research may be drawn. First, attentional biases 
in social anxiety (disorder) take the form of hypervigilance and/or avoidance in response 
to social threat. Second, overall, facial stimuli seem more potent in eliciting attentional 
biases relative to word stimuli. As Clark and Wells (1995) hypothesized, threatening 
words may assess mental preoccupation, whereas threatening faces may measure 
attention to actual social cues. Third, the standard stimulus duration (i.e., 500ms) of the 
dot-probe paradigm may need to be shortened (e.g., 100ms; Cooper & Langton, 2006) in 
order to keep earlier attentional processes (e.g., hypervigilance) from being masked by 
later attentional avoidance (see Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006; Mogg, Bradley, 
DeBono, & Painter, 1997). Fourth, attentional biases in non-clinical samples in response 
to emotional faces are more likely to be observed under conditions in which social 
anxiety is induced prior to the attentional bias assessment.  
Seeking convergent evidence from multiple experimental paradigms will help 
illuminate the nature of attentional bias in social anxiety because each paradigm may tap 
into different attentional mechanisms (Mogg et al., 2000). In Chapter 3, I will introduce 
the inattentional blindness experimental paradigm, which seems very relevant and 
applicable to the investigation of attentional biases in social anxiety with several 
methodological advantages over existing paradigms, particularly (the most widely used) 




CHAPTER 3: THE INATTENTIONAL BLINDNESS PARADIGM 
 
3.1. The Static Inattentional Blindness Paradigm 
3.1.1. Research Background 
 Inattentional Blindness (IB) is an intriguing phenomenon in which individuals fail 
to notice a supra-threshold stimulus presented in front of them when having no 
anticipation of its emergence. This paradigm was developed by Mack and Rock (1998) in 
an attempt to investigate the relationship between attention and perception. In this regard, 
prior research had typically sought to examine whether perception is “preattentive” (i.e., 
a search target is quickly detected regardless of the number of distracters) or “effortful” 
(i.e., target search is delayed as a function of the number of distracters). However, Mack 
and Rock (1998) argued that the prior methods failed to remove the contribution of 
attention from the task because a visual search necessarily leads the subjects to actively 
attend to the visual field due to the possible presence of the search target. To overcome 
this limitation, they invented a new method that effectively eliminates attention, in which 
the target object appears out of the blue while the individual is actively attending to a 
perceptual discrimination task. In this paradigm, the subject has no expectation of the real 
target object. 
3.1.2. Inattentional Blindness Task 
In a typical IB experiment, subjects are administered a computerized perceptual 
discrimination task. A small fixation cue appears at the center of the screen for 1500ms, 




presentation is shorter than is required for a saccadic eye movement to occur (Mack & 
Rock, 1998). The target cross is then covered by a circular pattern mask lasting for 
500ms, which is aimed at eliminating any residual visual processing after the cross 
disappears. The subject’s task is to determine the relative length of the vertical vs. 
horizontal line of the cross. This chain of events constitutes a regular discrimination trial, 
and approximately 10 trials are repeated with randomly varying crosses (See Figure 1).  
On the third or fourth trial, an extra object (i.e., the critical item) unexpectedly 
appears in the parafovea (i.e., 2 degrees from fixation) along with the target cross for 
200ms. This constitutes the inattentional trial. In this critical trial, subjects are asked 
whether they saw anything that had not been present on the screen in addition to the 
discrimination target cross. Another critical trial takes place on around the 7th trial, but 
this is called a divided attentional trial because the subject may already have started 
allocating some attention to the possible emergence of an extra object. The last trial asks 
the subject to fully attend to the screen ignoring the cross, which is called a full 
attentional trial. 
Testing a number of items as critical items under the inattentional trial, Mack and 
Rock (1998) have found that approximately 25% of the subjects did not even detect its 
presence, regardless of whether it was a moving bar, a black or colored small square or 
other geometric form. These individuals indeed failed to see the unexpected item, and 
accordingly their selection of the critical item from an array of alternatives remained at a 
chance level. Mack and Rock labeled this robust phenomenon as inattentional blindness 




However, since these findings, their research has focused on stimulus properties that 
attract attention based on the working hypothesis that there is no perception without 










Figure 1. Regular and Critical Trials with the Critical Item in Parafovea.  
 
Initially, Mack and Rock suspected that 25% IB might have occurred because the 
critical item was placed in the parafovea. Thus, they expected the complete elimination of 
IB in the case of the critical item appearing at fixation. However, contrary to their 
prediction, three times higher rates of IB were observed when the target cross appeared 
parafoveally and the critical item appeared at fixation. Sixty to 80% of observers failed to 
detect critical stimuli such as a simple (solid black or outlined) geometric figure identical 
Central cue – 1500ms 
Cross with or without  
the critical item – 200ms 





to those used in their earlier studies. This is counterintuitive considering the highest 
visual acuity and the maximum attention in the foveal region. Mack and Rock (1998) 
suggested that subjects actively inhibited their attention at fixation to handle the 
peripherally-presented target. Indeed, a modified version of the IB task showed that 
subjects were able to tacitly learn to inhibit attention towards particular spatial locations, 
which led to an increase in IB (Mack & Rock, 1998). 
3.1.3. Stimuli Seen Under the Inattentional Condition 
Particularly, Mack and Rock examined whether there exist some visual stimuli 
that would capture attention under the inattentional condition in which most stimuli went 
undetected. They found a few exceptional critical items that can be frequently seen, 
including the subject’s own name and a schematic happy-face icon (☺).  
3.1.3.1. One’s Own Name 
One’s own name has been highlighted in the selective attention literature for its 
unique capability to capture attention. For example, one can hear one’s own name being 
said elsewhere in a crowded noisy room (i.e., cocktail party effect; Cherry, 1953). The 
dichotic listening task also showed that about one-third of participants can hear their own 
name unexpectedly occurring from an unattended listening channel (Moray, 1959). Mack 
and Rock (1998) examined whether one’s own name would be seen under the 
inattentional condition, although they expected that it was unlikely the case because even 





They conducted an experiment presenting (a) one’s own name (3 to 5 letter first 
name subtending .73 to 1.4 degrees of visual angles; n=55), (b) other common names (i.e., 
David; n=20 or Alex; n=20), or (c) very common English words (i.e., Time; n=20 or 
House; n=20) as the critical item. For the three conditions, respectively, the IB rates were 
12.7%, 35%, and 50%, and the correct identification rates of the detectors were 83%, 
45%, and 35%, respectively. One’s own name was detected more often than the other two 
types, χ2(1)= 18.35, p < .001. Findings did not differ as a function of the length of words.  
 Several follow-up studies were conducted with respect to the unique ability of 
one’s own name to capture attention in the inattentional condition. In one experiment, 
they presented stimuli (i.e., both target crosses and the critical item) only for 100ms with 
no mask. Of 15 participants, 74% (N=11) detected their own name, and 73% (N=8) of the 
detectors correctly identified it. Of another 15 subjects presented with “Time” for 100ms 
on the critical trial, only 20% (N=3) detected it and none of them correctly identified it. 
This is a more convincing demonstration of the unique ability of one’s own name in 
capturing attention (Mack & Rock, 1998).  
In particular, they examined whether the perception of the unexpected 
presentation of one’s own name was determined by its meaning or its global physical 
features. In one study, individuals’ own names were modified in their first or second 
vowel (e.g., Ken to Kon, Jack to Jeck, Adam to Adem) with all other elements remaining 
constant. They predicted that a simple vowel modification should have little effect if the 
name perception was based on the coarse, global, or low-level stimulus information. Of 




(N=19) detected their names; whereas of those (N=20) whose names were modified, only 
40% (N=8) detected their names, χ2(1)= 13.8, p < .001. In the modified name condition, 
none of the eight detectors correctly identified the critical item. In contrast, another 
experiment revealed that the modification of common words (i.e., time to teme, and house 
to hause) did not change the detection rates (about 50%). From these findings, Mack and 
Rock (1988) concluded that it is the meaningfulness of the critical item that is critical in 
capturing attention under the inattentional condition. 
 These findings also bear an important implication with respect to the controversy 
between early and late selection theories in perception psychology. Early selection 
theories posited that an attentional filter operates at early stages on the basis of gross 
stimulus features of the input (Broadbent, 1958; Treisman, 1969), whereas late selection 
theories argued that selection occurs later after semantic processing has been completed 
(Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). Based on these findings, Mack and Rock (1998) suggest that 
attention enters at a later stage of processing. In other words, a stimulus will capture 
attention only after its meaning is analyzed (Mack, 2003). 
3.1.3.2. Happy Face 
 Another object that can be seen under inattentional conditions was a schematic 
happy face. Mack and Rock (1998) chose to use schematic faces to keep the stimulus 
features as simple as other geometric figures used in their earlier studies. In a standard IB 
experiment, they presented a smiling face, a frowning face, a scrambled face, or a circle 
at fixation as critical items, which subtended a visual angle of 0.6 degree. IB rates were 




p < .01 (See Table 1). They interpreted that the findings resulted from the meaningfulness 
of the happy face icon. With respect to the frowning face, they had initially suspected that 
its negative emotional valence might have repelled attention, leading to greater IB rates. 
However, they rejected this hypothesis based on another study that failed to demonstrate 
the difference between a frowning face and a neutral face in IB rates (Mack & Rock, 
1998). They also replicated these findings even after reducing the stimulus duration to 
100ms. A shorter stimulus duration exerted little effect on the attentional capture of the 
happy face icon (IB rates of 27% and 53% for the happy and frowning face, respectively).   
 
 Table 1. Percentage of Those Who Detected or Correctly Identified the Critical Item 
(Mack & Rock, 1998). 








% of detectors 85% 40% 63% 15% 
% of correct 
identifiers among 
detectors 
88% 63% 27% 15% 
 
3.1.4. Meaningfulness or Familiarity? 
Familiarity seems a reasonable alternative to meaningfulness in explaining the 
superior perception of one’s own name and a happy face icon. Mack and Rock (1998) 
deemed a familiarity account untenable arguing that simple geometric figures, common 
words (e.g., Time or House), or a brightly colored/moving square must be at least as 




examined this issue due to its significance. In one study, they presented The as the critical 
item, which is the most frequently used English word with no independent meaning (n = 
25). Another critical item was Tie (n = 25), which is graphically similar to The but less 
frequently used. If familiarity as opposed to meaningfulness is the primary determinant, 
The should be detected well in the critical trial. They found that The was detected by 63% 
(n=16) of the subjects, but only 37% (n=6) of the detectors identified it. Tie was detected 
by 40% (n=10) of the subjects and only 40% (n=4) of the detectors correctly identified it. 
The two conditions did not significantly differ. Moreover, the IB rate of The (36%) was 
significantly greater than that of one’s own name (5%), χ2(1)= 15.8, p <.01.  
 They also compared And and Ant as critical items in the same context. And is the 
fourth most frequent English word (Kucera & Francis, 1967), whereas Ant is a 
meaningful but less frequent word. Both words share gross sensory features, but 
considerably differ with respect to their frequencies in English. Similar to the study 
comparing The and Tie, detection rates did not differ significantly between And and Ant, 
although the trend was in favor of familiarity (i.e., IB rates were 25% and 45% for And 
and Ant, respectively).   
 Another test of the familiarity hypothesis presented a solid 0.6 degree black circle 
as the critical item. Prior to the standard inattentional experiment, all subjects were 
exposed to 10 prefamiliarization trials, which asked them to determine whether or not 
two target stimuli sequentially presented at fixation each for 200ms were identical. The 
black circle was one of the pair all throughout the ten trials. For 20 subjects, the black 




appeared on the first trial in order to examine whether prefamiliarization would result in a 
better detection of the black circle. Results revealed no difference in IB rates between the 
two conditions: 50% for the third trial condition and 60% for the first trial condition. 
These findings are at odd with the familiarity hypothesis (Mack & Rock, 1998). 
 Taken together, Mack and Rock (1998) reached a conclusion that meaningfulness 
is the primary determinant accounting for the perception of unexpected stimuli, whereas 
familiarity plays a much lesser role.  
3.1.5. Some Additional Evidence for the Meaningfulness Hypothesis 
 From the perspective of the meaningfulness hypothesis, Mack and Rock (1998) 
explored other stimuli that may have significant signal values. In one study, they 
compared Rape with Pear, Stop with Post, and Help with Held, as critical items under the 
inattentional condition. The results are summarized in Table 2. Rape was detected 
significantly better than Pear, χ2(1)= 4.29, p <.05, although Pear is a more common 
English word. In the same fashion, Stop was detected better than Post, χ2(1)= 8.89, p 
<.01. Help and Held did not significantly differ. 
 They also compared a swastika and two other novel figures made by transforming 
a swastika into an open or closed figure to eliminate its meaning. Of 15 subjects who 
were presented with the swastika as the critical item, 74% (n=11) detected it; whereas the 
other two transformed figures were detected merely by 40% and 47% of the subjects, 
respectively. Another experiment revealed that a stick human figure was detected by 80% 
of 20 participants, whereas a Christmas tree and house figures were detected by 45% and 




examined again in the upside-down orientation. Rotating the tree and house did not affect 
the detection rates (30% and 20%, respectively). However, in the case of the inverted 
stick human figure, the detection rate dropped from 80% to 30%. Mack and Rock (1998) 
suggested that the stick figure, which is even found in early prehistoric cave walls, is a 
basic schematic representation of a human, thereby being highly salient to human 
observers. 
 
Table 2. Rates of IB and Correct Identification of Other Meaningful Stimuli (Mack & 
Rock, 1998) 
 
% of Detectors (IB) % of Correct Identifiers among Detectors 
Rape 67% (33%) 90% 
Pear 54% (46%) 75% 
Stop 87% (13%) 69% 
Post 67% (33%) 60% 
Help 67% (33%) 70% 
Held 54% (46%) 63% 
 
3.1.6. Summary 
 A series of the studies based on the static IB paradigm demonstrated that an object 
that has a salient meaning to the viewer is likely to capture attention even when the 
individual has no intention or expectation to see it. Some data revealed that familiarity 
may affect the rates of IB and identification, but its role seems to be minimal compared to 




human figure) were modified to dilute their salient meanings while maintaining the 
global stimulus features, the detection rates dropped noticeably. Taken together, overall 
data indicate the primary role of meaningfulness. 
3.2. The Sustained Inattentional Blindness Paradigm 
3.2.1. Selective Looking Studies 
 Other researchers have used dynamic stimuli to investigate IB or similar forms of 
cognitive blindness. Neisser (1979) reported that 79% of observers, who were asked to 
count the number of basketball passes made by a group of people wearing white or black 
shirts in a video clip, failed to notice a woman with an umbrella unexpectedly appearing 
and walking across the screen. Recently, this selective-looking study was replicated by 
Simons and Chabris (1999). They found that 44% of participants failed to detect the 
unexpected emergence of a woman with an umbrella walking through a group of people 
passing basketballs one another. Interestingly, they found that the rates of detection 
failure arose to 73% in the case of an unexpected person appearing in a gorilla suit. 
Particularly, the failure was more frequent when the subjects were keeping track of the 
people in black than people in white. These findings suggest the importance of perceptual 
similarity between the unexpected stimulus and the ignored/attended stimuli (Simons & 
Chabris, 1999).  
3.2.2. The Sustained Inattentional Blindness Studies 
 A few concerns were raised regarding the static IB paradigm using the cross-line 
discrimination task: (a) the findings may not generalize to the real perceptual world and; 




observed IB effects might be due to a memory failure (inattentional amnesia; Wolfe, 
1999) rather than a perceptual failure resulting from inattention. To address these 
potential problems, Most and colleagues developed a sustained inattentional blindness 
paradigm (Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005; Most et al., 2001; Simons & Chabris, 
1999).  In this paradigm, for example, the subject views four white items and four black 
items on a dynamic computer display moving on haphazard paths for about 15 sec, 
occasionally bouncing off the edges of the display. The subject’s task is to count the 
number of times either only black or white items bounce off the edges (i.e., half of them 
will be attended to and the other half will be ignored). This constitutes a regular judgment 
trial. However, on the third trial (inattentional trial), an unexpected item appears in the 
middle of the right side of the display and slowly moves and exits to the left side of the 
screen. The unexpected object is present for a total of 5 sec. The same critical trial is 
repeated on the fourth trial (divided attentional trial). On the fifth and last trial, subjects 
are asked to watch the display without keeping a tally of the previously attended items. A 
series of studies have shown that this task can effectively generate IB (Most et al., 2005; 
Most et al., 2001).  
3.2.3. The Effects of Attentional Set on Detecting Unexpected Stimuli 
 Through a series of experiments based on the sustained IB paradigm, Most and 
colleagues have reached the conclusion that attentional set primarily determines what 
people see under the inattentional condition (For a review, see Most et al., 2005). In one 
experiment, the display consisted of two black circles, two black squares, two white 




circle as the critical item. Subjects were asked to count the number of bounces made by 
either (a) black shapes, (b) white shapes, (c) circles, or (d) squares. Results clearly 
demonstrated that the induced attentional set directly affected the detection of the critical 
item. Of subjects told to attend to the black shapes or the circles, the majority (88% and 
81%, respectively) detected the black circle. In contrast, among those instructed to attend 
to the white shapes or the squares, almost none detected the critical item (0% and 6%, 
respectively). These findings suggest that the critical item is likely to be detected when it 
matches the characteristics of the induced attentional set (Most et al., 2005).  
To address the possibility that subjects might not have reported the presence of 
the critical item simply because they had regarded it as one of the distracter items, Most 
et al (2005) conducted a follow-up experiment using a critical item that was more clearly 
distinguished from the distracter items (i.e., a gray circle). Regardless of the increased 
salience, a strong effect of attentional set emerged with respect to shape. Of those 
attending to the circles, only 14% missed the gray circle; whereas of those keeping track 
of the squares, 93% missed it (Most et al., 2005). Another study also demonstrated the 
effect of attentional set using more complex stimuli. The display consisted of four 
Caucasian male faces and four African American male faces, and the critical item was 
either of the two faces. Results revealed that the African American face was more likely 
to be detected by those attending to African American faces (81%) than those attending 
to Caucasian faces (40%). In contrast, the Caucasian face was more likely to be detected 
by those attending to Caucasian faces (68%) than those attending to African American 




Taken together, the sustained IB paradigm seems to provide a test setting more 
analogous to the real perceptual world that is filled with dynamic, complex and sustained 
visual images. Overall data indicate the strong role of the perceiver’s mindset to attend to 
certain properties of stimuli. 
3.2.4. Roles of Stimuli Properties in the Sustained IB Experiments 
 Most and colleagues particularly emphasized the role of attentional set in 
detecting the unexpected objects under the sustained inattentional condition. However, 
they also examined the role of stimuli salience (Most et al., 2005) as an alternative 
account. In one experiment, distracters were four black circles and four black squares, 
with either a white or black triangle as the critical item. Subjects were told to count the 
number of bounces made by the circles. They hypothesized that the white and the black 
triangles should be detected equivalently if stimulus salience (i.e., white color) has no 
effect, given that the shape is the critical dimension of the induced attentional set. Results 
showed that detection rates for the white triangle and the black triangle was 68% and 
38%, respectively. This finding suggests that sustained IB is indeed affected by the 
salience of the critical item. However, the magnitude of its impact did not seem to match 
that of perceiver’s attentional set (Most et al., 2005). 
 To increase the salience of the critical item, Most and colleagues used a critical 
item abruptly appearing in the display. The implicit attention capture literature has 
reliably demonstrated that a sudden onset attracts attention (Jonides & Yantis, 1988). A 
series of experiments were conducted where critical items appeared abruptly about 1.5 




al., 2005). However, results failed to clearly demonstrate the benefits of sudden onsets. 
Overall, the detection rates did not differ between the gradual onset and sudden onset 
conditions (42% vs. 45%).  
 Taken together, these findings suggest that the top-down influence of the 
perceiver’s attentional set is greater than the bottom-up contribution of the stimuli 
salience in the detection of the critical stimuli under the sustained inattentional condition. 
Contrary to the implicit attention capture literature, even sudden onsets of the critical 
item did not increase its capability to capture the viewer’s attention. Relative to the 
physical features of the stimuli themselves, their match (or mismatch) with the viewer’s 
attentional set is more important in the sustained IB paradigm (Most et al., 2005). 
3.3. Advantages of the IB Paradigm 
 This dissertation study was primarily motivated by the expectation that modified 
versions of static and sustained IB tasks presenting socially relevant stimuli such as 
emotional faces would be a promising method to investigate attentional biases in social 
anxiety. Particularly, this approach is expected to circumvent some methodological 
problems underlying the existing cognitive experiment paradigms in the field of social 
anxiety. 
Despite the overall success of the emotional Stroop paradigm in demonstrating 
longer color-naming latencies linked to social anxiety, some methodological and 
interpretational problems render its status as an attentional bias measure for social anxiety 
questionable. First, the specificity of these findings is uncertain because other groups of 




Mathews & Macleod, 1985). Second, several authors have indicated that the Stroop effect 
is likely confounded with various non-attentional mental processes such as mental 
preoccupation, cognitive avoidance, or emotional reaction to threat words (Bogels & 
Mansell, 2004; Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996; 
Asmundson & Stein, 1994). Third, it has been found that the Stroop interference may be 
overridden by effortful control strategies (Amir et al., 1996; Amir et al., 2002). Williams 
and colleagues (1996) suggested that participants may increase their effort to compensate 
for the Stroop interference when becoming anxious. Taken together, the Stroop paradigm 
does not seem to necessarily tap into biased attentional processing in social anxiety. 
The dot-probe paradigm also has some methodological limitations. First, some 
studies using threat word stimuli demonstrated attentional biases only when threat cues 
appeared in the upper area of the screen, to which initial visual attention may be oriented 
(Asmundson & Stein, 1994; Horenstein and Segui, 1997). These findings suggest that the 
dot-probe paradigm still leaves room for non-attentional response factors. Relatedly, 
Mogg and colleagues (2000) suggested that high trait anxious individuals may easily use 
strategies to counteract their vigilance towards threat words and that the dot-probe 
paradigm presents a relatively fragile index of attentional biases in normal samples. 
Second, this paradigm has to place social cues in competition with non-social or less 
threatening social cues in order to index attentional bias. This comparative context does 
not allow the attentional processing of a social cue to be independently examined. The 
competition within the pair of stimuli also poses some interpretative ambiguity. For 




threatening or neutral cue, may arise from the inhibition of the less threatening cue, the 
facilitation of the more threatening cue, or both (see Cooper & Langton, 2006; Koster, 
Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004). Unlike previous studies, Cooper and 
Langton (2006) revealed that it was not the vigilance to the threat, but the inhibition of 
less threatening cues that accounted for the faster detection of the probe following 
threatening faces.  
In contrast, the IB paradigm offers several potential advantages over the existing 
Stroop and Dot-Probe paradigms in the assessment of information processing biases 
associated with psychopathology in general and social anxiety in particular. First, due to 
the unexpected emergence of the real search target, potential non-attentional response 
factors on the part of the subject are reduced. In any simple, repetitive cognitive task with 
an apparent task goal, subjects may be apt to employ some response strategies 
particularly when asked to perform under the pressure of time and accuracy. In this 
regard, the IB paradigm has a unique methodological strength due to its secretive and 
unexpected nature of the real search target, which would help investigate more purely 
attentional aspects of cognitive processing. Second, the IB paradigm may provide a more 
direct measure of attentional hypervigilance to the social threat cue itself, relative to the 
emotional Stroop or dot-probe paradigms in which attentional biases are inferred 
indirectly through either slower (Stroop) or faster (dot-probe) processing of non-social 
stimuli (i.e., color of words or location of dots). Moreover, the IB paradigm allows us to 
examine how the social cue itself was processed in a very attentionally-limited condition, 




while leaving it uncertain how the individual processed the social cue. Taken together, 
compared to the emotional Stroop or dot-probe paradigms, the IB paradigm seems to 
present a testing situation that better emulates the clinical reality of SAD where 
attentional bias leads the socially anxious individual to engage in the processing of 
potentially negative social cues that could unexpectedly occur even in essentially non-
evaluative situations.  
3.4. The Present Studies 
In Chapter 4 and 5, I will report data from two independent experiments 
conducted on the basis of the static IB (Experiment 1) and sustained IB (Experiment 2) 
paradigms, respectively. The present studies employed an analogue approach based on 
non-clinical samples, which makes it possible to use a complex experimental design 
requiring a large number of subjects and to pilot a new task in an efficient fashion (Stopa 
& Clark, 2001). The FNES has been extensively used in analogue studies of SAD, and its 
validity in this context has been well demonstrated (For a review, see Stopa & Clark, 
2001). The FNES distinguishes social phobics from normal controls and patients with 
other anxiety disorders. It is also significantly associated with other social anxiety 
measures; and the differences observed between high and low scorers on this instrument 
mirror those observed between social phobics and non-anxious controls. A pilot study 
including approximately 1500 University of Texas students revealed that total scores of 
“22 or higher” and “10 or lower” on the FNES determined the top and bottom 25%, 
respectively. Stopa and Clark (2001) suggested that 75th and 25th percentile scores be 




CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 1 – AN INVESTIGATION  
USING THE STATIC IB PARADIGM 
 
The principal goal of the present study was to examine the utility of the IB 
paradigm for investigating attentional bias in social anxiety. Given that this is the first 
study to use the IB paradigm in a psychopathology context, I sought to replicate the 
experimental setting of the original Mack & Rock (1998) study using the schematic facial 
icons. In the present study, college students who displayed high (HSAs) or low (LSAs) 
levels of social anxiety on the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNES; Watson & 
Friend, 1969) were randomly assigned to one of three critical item conditions (i.e., happy 
face, frowning face, or circle) in the presence or absence of a bogus-speech social anxiety 
induction manipulation.  
In the context of social anxiety, negative facial expressions are likely to carry a 
more meaningful signal portending negative social evaluation to HSAs than to LSAs. 
Thus, we hypothesized that HSAs would show a significantly higher 
detection/identification rate of the frowning face relative to LSAs; LSAs would show a 
significantly higher detection/identification rate of the happy face relative to HSAs; and 
that these hypothesized differences in detection/identification rates would be present only 
for participants assigned to the social anxiety induction condition. The instructional 
manipulation based on a bogus speech task would activate individuals’ social schema 
related to social anxiety-provoking situations, thereby maximizing the differences 




hypotheses put forth a three-way interaction between social anxiety status (high vs. low), 
social anxiety induction manipulation (present or absent), and critical item condition (i.e., 
happy face, frowning face, or circle). No significant interaction effects were expected 
with respect to detection/identification rates from the divided and full attention trials 
because it should be far less difficult to detect or identify the supra-threshold stimuli 
presented in the fovea once one is expecting its emergence. In addition, no significant 
effects were expected with respect to detection/identification of the non-social critical 
item (i.e., circle). 
Taken together, attentional hypervigilance to social threat was indexed by the 
significant increases of the detection/identification rates in response to the frowning face 
as opposed to the happy face. Although the “IB rates” and the “detection rates” provide 
the identical information, we chose to frame our hypotheses and findings in terms of 
detection rather than IB because detection denotes attentional vigilance more directly. 
4.1. Participants 
 Undergraduate students (N=1684) enrolled in introductory psychology courses at 
the University of Texas at Austin were screened using the FNES. Those who scored less 
than or equal to 10 (LSAs; N=410) or greater than or equal to 22 (HSAs; N=421) were 
invited to participate in the experiment in partial fulfillment of their experimental credit. 
Of those, 298 students replied to the invitation. Upon retesting, 22 participants no longer 
met the FNES criteria. The final sample consisted of 276 students (110 males, 166 




(54.2%), Hispanic (21.5%), Asian/Pacific Islander (15.3%), African American (5.8%) 
and other (3.2%). 
4.2. Materials 
 An IB task was generated following the description of the original study (Mack & 
Rock, 1998). All trials took place on a white background of a 14.1 inch color monitor 
screen, from which the subject was seated at a 76 cm. distance. Each regular 
discrimination trial proceeded as follows: (a) a small black fixation point was presented 
at the center of the white screen for 1500msec; (b) a target cross appeared in the 
parafovea within 2.3 degrees of fixation on one of the four quadrants for 200msec; (c) the 
cross was replaced by a circle 10.6 cm in diameter with a complex black and white 
pattern lasting for 500msec; and (d) subjects were then asked to indicate their judgment 
as to the relative length of the cross lines by pressing the “V” key in the case of the 
vertical line being longer, or the “H” key in the case of the horizontal line being longer. 
The experiment consisted of 10 discrimination trials in total (See Figure 2). The size of 
the target cross varied from trial to trial, with the length of a cross line ranging from 3.0 
to 4.5 degrees. The difference between the vertical and horizontal lines was 
approximately 0.3 to 0.5 degrees. 
Of the 10 trials, the fourth, eighth, and tenth trials presented an additional 
unexpected item for 200msec at fixation. The fourth trial constituted the inattentional 
trial. During this trial, participants were presented with a happy face, frowning face, or 
circle. The happy and frowning faces differed only with respect to the orientation of the 




with the two facial icons. These critical items subtended a visual angle of 0.6 degree (i.e., 
approximately 1 centimeter). In this trial, after the regular cross judgment procedure, the 
subjects were asked whether they saw anything that had not been present on the screen. 
Affirmative responses were further probed (e.g., what kind of object did you notice? How 
big was the object? Where did you see that?) to determine what was noticed and to ensure 
that the participant was referring to the intended target. Then, a recognition test followed 
asking them to select what they saw in the inattentional trial from an array of five items 
consisting of a square, a diamond, and the three critical items (See Figure 3). If they 
reported seeing nothing but the cross, they were first asked to guess what they failed to 
detect.  Following this open-ended probe, they were then presented the object array and 


















The eighth trial was identical to the fourth trial, but constituted a divided 
attentional trial because the subject was likely to be privy to the possible emergence of an 
additional object. The tenth trial presented the same critical item used in the fourth and 
eighth trials, but subjects were instructed to ignore the cross and just to report what they 
may see in the display, thereby constituting the full attentional trial. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Object Array for the Recognition Test in the static IB task 
 
4.3. Experimental Design 
 A 2 x 3 x 2 completely crossed factorial design was used to investigate the effects 
of participants’ social anxiety status (high vs. low), critical item condition (happy face, 
frowning face, and circle), and the presence or absence of a bogus speech anxiety 
induction task on detection/identification rates using the IB paradigm. HSAs and LSAs 
were each randomized to one of six experimental conditions: (a) Frowning face – Social 
Anxiety Induction, (b) Frowning face – No Social Anxiety Induction; (c) Happy face – 
Social Anxiety Induction, (d) Happy face – No Social Anxiety Induction; (e) Circle – 
Social Anxiety Induction, (f) Circle – No Social Anxiety Induction. Participants’ 




trials:  Trial 4 (Inattention trial), Trial 8 (Divided Attention Trial), and Trial 10 (Full 
Attention Trial). 
4.4. Measures 
 The Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNES; Watson & Friend, 1969), which is 
a 30-item questionnaire measuring social-evaluative concern, was used as a pre-screening 
instrument. A pilot study based on 1520 students at the University of Texas at Austin 
revealed that total scores of “22 or higher” and “10 or lower” on the FNES determined 
the top and bottom 25%, respectively. 
A battery of social anxiety measures was administered prior to the IB task, which 
included: (a) the FNES; (b) Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS: Mattick & Clarke, 
1998) - a 20 item questionnaire assessing social anxiety experienced in dyadic and group 
interactions; and (c) Social Phobia Scale (SPS: Mattick & Clarke, 1998) - a 20 item 
questionnaire assessing fear of performance and observation situations.  
General emotional distress was measured by the State Trait Anxiety Questionnaire-
Trait Version (STAI-T; Spielberger, Grosuch, Luchere, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) and the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, Mock, & Erlbaugh, 1961).  
An author-constructed mood checklist was administered to obtain participants’ 
ratings on 8 emotional adjectives (i.e., angry, anxious, happy, despondent, tense, rested, 
nervous, and jittery) in reference to their current mood on a 0 (Not at all) to 100 
(Extremely) scale. Of these, 5 anxiety-related adjectives (i.e., anxious, tense, rested, 






The experimenter met with each participant in the laboratory and provided an 
explanation about the study. Subjects were briefly told that the study was designed to 
examine the nature of social discomfort and that the procedure would involve a packet of 
questionnaires, a short computer task, (and a videotaped speech task in the case of 
subjects who were assigned to the social anxiety induction condition). After obtaining 
informed written consent, the questionnaire battery was administered. Upon its 
completion, those assigned to the social anxiety induction condition received an 
additional instruction, “As written in the consent form, you will be asked to prepare and 
give a 3-minute videotaped speech in front of a panel of three speech evaluators. They 
will evaluate your speech in terms of appearance, speech content, vocalization, 
interaction with the audience, demonstrated confidence and so forth. I will provide you 
with a list of speech topics from which you can choose to speak about, and you will be 
left alone for 3 minutes to prepare the speech”. The subject was then given a list of 12 
controversial speech topics (e.g., abortion, seatbelt regulation laws, gay marriage, war in 
Iraq, etc.) and spent three minutes preparing for the speech on the selected topic.  After 
the three minutes, the experimenter came back with a video camera and said “The 
preparation time is over. This video camera will be used to record your speech. Now 
before starting the speech task, you need to carry out a computer task as part of the pre-
assessment”. The mood checklist was administered again before the IB computer task 
began. Participants who did not undergo the social anxiety induction manipulation were 




After the experimenter explained about the cross-line discrimination task, the subject 
began the IB computer task by pressing the space bar of the keyboard. According to the 
assigned condition, one of three IB tasks was executed presenting a happy face, a 
frowning face, or a circle as the critical item. Throughout the IB task, the experimenter 
stayed at a distance of 1.5 meters from the subject and remained silent except in the three 
critical trials, in which they guided the subject through each additional probing step (i.e., 
asking the subject to elaborate the detected item and recognize/guess the item from the 
object array). 
4.6. Data Analyses 
Two primary indices were used in the data analyses. They consisted of: (a) the 
proportion of participants who detected the critical item in the inattentional trial and (b) 
the proportion of participants who identified the critical item in the inattentional trial. The 
identification rates included those who detected and correctly identified the critical item. 
Hierarchical logistic regression analyses were performed to examine the singular and 
interactive effects of each of the three independent variables (i.e., social anxiety status, 
critical item condition, and social anxiety-induction manipulation) on the binary 
outcomes of detection and identification in the inattentional trial. The same analytic 
procedure was applied to detection and correct identification rates of the divided and full 
attentional trials. 
4.7. Statistical Power to Detect Differences in Detection/Identification Rates 
The program G* Power 3 (SPSS, Release 2.0) was used to calculate power for the 




conducted for the most stringent analytic test— the social anxiety status critical 
item bogus speech manipulation three-way interaction—following the logic that the 
sufficient power for these stringent analyses will yield more than adequate power for the 
less stringent analyses. Statistical power to detect a medium effect size (difference in 
detection/identification rate of .25) in the hypothesized direction with the sample size in 
Experiment 1 and setting alpha at .05 (one-tailed) was .79. 
4.8. Results 
4.8.1. Group Characteristics 
Table 3 presents means and standard deviations of the demographic and clinical 
measures across the 12 experimental conditions. Compared with LSAs, HSAs consisted 
of more females (67% vs. 54%), χ2(1) = 4.70, p = .030. HSAs also scored significantly 
higher than LSAs on the FNES (mean = 25.22 vs. 5.54), t(274) = 59.93, p < .001; SPS 
(mean = 28.55 vs. 7.09), t(274) = 17.44, p < .001; SIAS (mean = 36.21 vs. 12.97), t(274) 
= 20.02; p < .001; BDI (mean = 11.73 vs. 3.60), t(274) = 11.51, p < .001; and STAI-trait 
(mean = 50.24 vs. 32.86), t(274) = 15.94, p < .001. There were no significant differences 
in the demographic and clinical measures between the two social anxiety induction 
conditions or the three critical item conditions. Overall, the randomization was successful 
in creating group equivalence on the study measures. 
4.8.2. Social Anxiety Induction Manipulation Check  
 The effectiveness of the social anxiety induction manipulation was assessed by 
comparing the pre- and post manipulation anxiety index computed from the Mood 




did not differ significantly in their pre-manipulation state anxiety scores (social anxiety 
induction condition - mean = 27.15, SD = 18.84; no social anxiety induction condition - 
mean = 23.59, SD = 14.32; t(274) = 1.77, p = .079). Whereas, after the anxiety-induction 
manipulation, those who received the social anxiety induction manipulation reported 
significantly higher anxiety scores (mean = 48.49, SD = 27.65) compared to those who 
did not receive the social anxiety induction manipulation (mean = 23.39, SD = 15.16), 
t(274) = 9.35, p < .001. The differences between pre- and post manipulation anxiety 
scores were also significant only for those who received the social anxiety induction 
manipulation, t(137) = 12.84, p < .001. Table 4 presents the means and standard 
deviations of pre- and post manipulation anxiety scores across the 12 experimental 
groups. Overall, relative to LSAs, HSAs displayed a greater increase in the anxiety scores 
in response to the social anxiety induction manipulation. 
4.8.3. Differences in Detection Rates for the Inattentional Trial 
 The three dichotomous independent variables were entered into a hierarchical 
logistic regression model to predict the binary outcome of detection performance in the 
inattentional trial. Entered in Step 1 were the three main effects (i.e., social anxiety status, 
critical item condition, and social anxiety-induction manipulation). In Step 2, the three 
two-way interaction terms formed by the cross-product of the three predictors were 
entered, and in Step 3, the three-way interaction term was entered.  
 Table 5 presents the detection rates across the 12 experimental. In Step 1, there 
was a main effect only for the critical item condition: (a) the happy face was detected 




4.77, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) [2.52, 9.01]; and (b) the frowning was also detected 
better than the circle (64.8% vs. 24.4%), B = 1.75, Wald = 27.35, p < .001, odds ratio = 
5.73, 95% CI [2.98, 11.02]. In Step 2, a significant two-way interaction was observed 
between the critical item condition and the social anxiety-induction condition, (B = 1.25, 
Wald = 4.09, p = .043, odds ratio = 3.48, 95% CI[1.04, 11.63]). Follow-up analyses 
showed that participants undergoing the social anxiety induction manipulation were 
significantly more likely to detect the frowning face better than the happy face (72.7% vs. 
54.0%), Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .048. In contrast, there was a non-significant reverse 
trend among those not undergoing the social anxiety induction manipulation to detect the 
happy face better than the frowning face (67.3% vs. 57.4%), Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 
.215. Figure 4 depicts this significant critical item by social anxiety induction interaction. 
In Step 3, the three-way interaction was not significant. 
4.8.4. Differences in Identification Rates for the Inattentional Trial 
 An identical analytic approach used for the analyses of detection rates was applied 
to the binary outcome of identification in the inattentional trial. Step 1 revealed a 
significant main effect for the critical item condition indicating: (a) the happy face was 
identified better than the circle (55.6% vs. 17.4%), B = 1.78, Wald = 26.02, p < .001, 
odds ratio = 5.95, 95% CI [3.00, 11.81], and (b) the frowning face was also identified 
better than the circle (41.8% vs. 17.4%), B = 1.23, Wald = 11.92, p = .001, odds ratio = 
3.42, 95% CI [1.70, 6.86]. In Step 2, none of the two-way interaction terms were 
significant. In Step 3, the three-way interaction term involving the contrast between the 




of the three individual predictors and their two-way interactions, B = 2.54, Wald = 4.41, 
p = .036, odds ratio = 12.70, 95% CI [1.18, 136.17]. To further probe this three-way 
interaction, the two-way critical item by social anxiety status interaction was further 
examined for each level of the social anxiety induction condition. Results revealed a 
significant critical item (happy vs. frowning face) by social anxiety status interaction only 
for those who underwent the social anxiety-induction manipulation, B = 2.34, Wald = 
7.19, p = .007, odds ratio = 10.36, 95% CI [1.88, 57.25].  Further analyses revealed that 
under the social anxiety-induction manipulation, HSAs outperformed LSAs in identifying 
the frowning face (61.9% vs. 26.1%), Fisher’s exact test, p = .018. In contrast, there was 
a non-significant reverse trend for LSAs to outperform HSAs in identifying the happy 
face (60.0% vs. 40.0%), Fisher’s exact test, p = .129. In the absence of the social anxiety-
induction manipulation, HSAs and LSAs did not differ in identifying the facial icons. 
The nature of the observed three-way interaction was also examined by comparing 
the happy vs. frowning face conditions separately for LSAs and HSAs. LSAs who 
underwent the social anxiety-induction manipulation identified the happy face 
significantly better than the frowning face (60.0% vs. 26.1%), Fisher’s exact test, p = 
.018. There was a non-significant trend for HSAs to identify the frowning face better than 
the happy face (61.9% vs. 40.0%), Fisher’s exact test, p = .118. In contrast, both LSAs 
and HSAs assigned to the no social anxiety-induction condition, showed a non-significant 
trend for better identification of the happy face over the frowning face (LSAs – 56.0% vs. 




.096). Figure 5 presents the identification rates in the inattentional trial across the 12 
experiment groups. 
4.8.5. Controlling for Gender and General Emotional Distress 
 HSA and LSA participants differed significantly with respect to gender. Thus, we 
repeated the logistic hierarchical regression analyses using gender as a covariate in Step 1 
for the detection and identification rates from the inattentional trial. We also entered the 
BDI and STAI-trait in Step 1 to examine the possibility that the observed interaction 
effects were accounted for by general emotional distress. For the detection rates, 
depression and trait anxiety did not significantly contribute to the model, whereas there 
was a significant gender effect indicating that males displayed a higher detection rate 
than females (59.1% vs. 45.2%), B = .62, Wald = 5.23, p = .022, odds ratio = 1.86, 95% 
CI [1.09, 3.18]; Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .016. However, after controlling for the three 
covariates, the observed critical item condition by social anxiety induction condition 
interaction still remained significant, B = 1.28, Wald = 4.17, p = .041, odds ratio = 3.59, 
95% CI [1.05, 12.20].   
In Step 1, none of the three covariates significantly predicted identification rates 
from the inattentional trial. However, there was a non-significant trend for males to 
outperform females in overall identification rates (44.5% vs. 35.5%), B = .49, Wald = 
3.21, p = .073, odds ratio = 1.63, 95% CI [.96, 2.77]; Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .085. The 
three-way interaction remained significant even after controlling for the effects of 
depression, trait anxiety, and gender, B = 2.75, Wald = 4.98, p = .026, odds ratio = 15.61, 




 We also examined the possibility that the observed group differences may be due 
to differential perceptual accuracy by comparing participants’ cross-line discrimination 
accuracy across the 12 experiment groups. The overall accuracy for the entire sample was 
73.4% (SD = 18.28) and there were no significant differences across the 12 experimental 
groups. 
4.8.6. Differences in Detection and Identification Rates for the Divided and Full-
Attention Trials 
 Table 5 presents the detection and identification rates from the divided and full 
attentional trials. Although our primary interest was in examining the detection and 
identification rates in the inattentional trial, we repeated the analyses reported above for 
the data derived from the divided and full attentional trials. Consistent with prediction, 
once participants expected the emergence of the critical item (divided attentional trial) the 
significant interactions observed in the inattentional trial were no longer present. 
However, the critical item main effect for the detection rates was still significant 
indicating that the happy face was detected better than the circle (96.0% vs. 77.6%), B = 
1.92, Wald = 11.25, p = .001, odds ratio = 6.87, 95% CI [2.23, 21.18], and the frowning 
face was detected better than the circle (91.2% vs. 77.6%), B = 1.09, Wald = 5.72, p = 
.017, odds ratio = 2.97, 95% CI [1.22, 7.23]. The critical item main effect for the 
identification rates was also significant indicating that the happy face was identified 
better than the frowning face (86.9% vs. 73.6%), B = .86, Wald = 5.12, p = .024, odds 
ratio = 2.37, 95% CI [1.12, 5.01], or the circle (86.9% vs. 74.4%), B = .82, Wald = 4.50, 




instructed to attend fully to the emergence of the critical item (full attentional trial), 
detection and identification rates were uniformly high with no significant main or 
interaction effects of participants’ social anxiety status, critical item, or social anxiety 
induction (See Table 5). 
4.8.7. Gender Differences in Detection and Identification Rates 
Although the observed interaction effects remained unaffected after controlling for 
the gender effect, we conducted another set of hierarchical logistic regression analyses to 
further examine the role of gender and its possible interaction with the three IVs (i.e., 
critical item, social anxiety status, and social anxiety-induction) in predicting the 
detection and identification rates from the three critical trials. Gender and the three IVs 
were entered into Step 1, and the two-way interaction terms of gender by each of the 
three IVs were entered into Step 2.  
4.8.7.1. Prediction of detection rates 
Results revealed significant effects of gender only in the case of the detection and 
identification rates from the inattentional trial. In Step 1, the main effect of gender was 
significant, indicating that males outperformed females in overall detection (59.1% vs. 
45.2%), B = .62, Wald = 5.16, p = .023, odds ratio = 1.85, 95% CI [1.09, 3.15]. In Step 2, 
there was a significant gender by critical item interaction involving the contrast between 
the happy and frowning faces, B = 1.52, Wald = 5.27, p = .022, odds ratio = 4.59, 95% CI 
[1.25, 16.83]. Follow-up analyses revealed that males significantly outperformed females 
in detecting the happy face (81.1% vs. 48.4%), Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .001. In contrast, 




vs. females – 64.7%; Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .577) or the circle (males – 27.3% vs. 
females – 22.6%; Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .406). 
 
4.8.7.2. Prediction of identification rates 
With respect to the identification rates from the inattentional trial, Step 1 revealed a 
non-significant trend for males to outperform females in overall identification of the 
critical item (35.5% vs. 44.5%), B = .47, Wald = 3.04, p = .081, odds ratio = 1.60, 95% 
CI [.94, 2.72]. A similar gender by critical item interaction was observed, B = 2.36, Wald 
= 13.04, p < .001, odds ratio = 10.58, 95% CI [2.94, 38.04]. Further analyses revealed 
that males significantly outperformed females in identifying the happy face (males – 
78.4% vs. females – 41.9%; Fisher’s Exact Test, p < .001), whereas females showed a 
non-significant trend of better identification of the frowning face (males – 32.5% vs. 
females – 49.0%; Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .085). There was no gender difference for the 
circle (males – 21.2% vs. females – 15.1%; Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .328).  
These gender by critical item condition interaction effects remained significant 
even after controlling for social anxiety, trait anxiety, and depression. Gender did not 
interact with either participants’ social anxiety status or their social anxiety induction 
manipulation. 
4.8.8. Additional Evidence of Vigilant Attention towards the Critical Item 
 Finally, we conducted additional analyses to further examine the evidence of 
attentional vigilance towards the critical items. If the critical item attracted the viewer’s 




cross-line discrimination task, thereby leading to poorer performance on the cross-line 
discrimination task among those who detected or identified the critical item. The 
accuracy of the cross-line discrimination was compared between detectors and non-
detectors (also between identifiers and non-identifiers) determined from the inattentional 
trial. Consistent with expectation, the discrimination accuracy did not differ between 
detectors (identifiers) and non-detectors (non-identifiers) on regular cross trials (#1, 2, 3, 
5, 6, 7, and 9). In contrast, relative to non-detectors, detectors showed a significantly 
poorer performance on the inattentional trial (#4; Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .040), and on 
the divided attention trial (#8, Fisher’s Exact Tests, p = .009). Likewise, relative to non-
identifiers, identifiers showed a nonsignificant trend toward poorer performance on the 
inattentional trial, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .075, and a significantly poorer performance 
on the divided attention trial, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .015. Table 6 presents correct 
response rates between detectors (identifiers) and non-detectors (non-identifiers) across 






Table 3. Experimental Group Characteristics in Experiment 1 
 
 No Speech Bogus Speech 



















































Age 19.48 18.96 18.75 18.83 19.50 18.50 18.80 18.76 18.87 18.62 19.05 19.18 
 (2.60) (0.75) (0.44) (1.07) (1.82) (0.61) (1.12) (1.64) (1.06) (0.92) (1.76) (2.40) 
Gender 
(% Male) 40% 29% 42% 43% 36% 35% 48% 32% 56% 33% 55% 27% 
FNES 4.92 25.21 5.88 24.96 6.09 24.30 5.48 25.20 4.57 25.81 6.41 25.82 
 (3.34) (2.36) (2.63) (2.67) (3.39) (3.01) (3.07) (2.00) (2.79) (2.16) (2.75) (2.13) 
SPS 6.16 28.79 7.63 27.30 8.36 23.70 6.88 30.28 6.65 31.57 6.95 29.14 
 (3.54) (14.90) (4.50) (11.57) (7.42) (11.59) (4.19) (14.65) (8.24) (11.44) (4.23) (15.69) 
SIAS 11.24 32.08 14.50 36.26 13.82 31.20 12.24 40.04 12.04 37.19 14.23 39.91 
 (4.00) (12.40) (4.77) (12.21) (6.73) (9.87) (5.90) (11.92) (5.83) (12.27) (6.24) (13.04) 
BDI 2.16 12.17 3.33 13.57 4.91 7.80 3.28 11.92 4.26 11.29 3.91 13.09 
 (2.59) (8.30) (2.81) (9.41) (3.89) (5.52) (3.06) (6.48) (3.62) (6.92) (4.37) (6.75) 
STAI 31.68 49.42 31.83 50.13 34.32 45.65 31.16 53.80 31.43 49.86 37.27 51.77 




Table 4. Pre- and Post Manipulation Anxiety Scores across the 12 Experiment Groups in Experiment 1 
 No Speech Bogus Speech 




















































15.28 30.92 17.67 32.09 17.36 29.40 18.64 38.64 17.04 39.86 13.64 35.73 
(5.97) (16.12) (8.72) (16.52) (10.94) (14.39) (12.37) (16.08) (16.66) (18.44) (8.96) (19.13) 




Table 5. Detection and Identification Rates of the Three Critical Trials across the 12 Experiment Groups in Experiment 1 
 
 
No Speech Bogus Speech 
 
Happy Frowning Circle Happy Frowning Circle 
 
LSAs HSAs LSAs HSAs LSAs HSAs LSAs HSAs LSAs HSAs LSAs HSAs 
Inattentional 
   Detection Rate (%) 68.0 66.7 50.0 65.2 22.7 20.0 60.0 48.0 69.6 76.2 27.3 27.3 
   Identification Rate (%) 56.0 66.7 37.5 43.5 9.1 15.0 60.0 40.0 26.1 61.9 22.7 22.7 
Divided Attention  
   Detection Rate (%) 
92.0 100.0 83.3 100.0 90.9 78.9 96.0 96.0 91.3 90.5 72.7 68.2 
   Identification Rate (%) 88.0 83.3 58.3 87.0 81.8 75.0 84.0 92.0 73.9 76.2 72.7 68.2 
Full Attention 
   Detection Rate (%) 100.0 95.8 100.0 100.0 95.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.7 100.0 100.0 95.5 
   Identification Rate (%) 92.0 87.5 87.5 95.7 90.9 100.0 96.0 96.0 87.0 100.0 95.5 95.5 
Overall Accuracy – Cross 






Table 6. Proportions (%) of Correct Responders across the Cross-Line Discrimination 
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Figure 4. Detection Rates in the Inattentional Trial (Experiment 1) 
 Detectors Non-detectors Identifiers Non-identifiers 
Trial 1 62.9% 63.2% 61.1% 64.3% 
Trial 2 77.9% 75.0% 76.9% 76.2% 
Trial 3 80.7% 78.7% 79.6% 79.8% 
Trial 4 
(Inattentional) 77.1% 86.0% 76.9% 84.5% 
Trial 5 69.3% 67.6% 72.2% 66.1% 
Trial 6 67.9% 65.4% 69.4% 64.9% 
Trial 7 85.7% 80.9% 85.2% 82.1% 
Trial 8 
(Divided 
Attention) 67.9% 80.9% 66.7% 79.2% 
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Figure 5. Identification Rates in the Inattentional Trial (Experiment 1) 
 
4.9. Discussion 
To my knowledge, this is the first study to apply the IB paradigm to the field of 
anxiety disorders specifically or psychopathology more generally. Mack and Rock (1998) 
argued that perception occurs only when attention is engaged in the target object. It 
follows that even an object being directly looked at can evade perception if it receives 
insufficient attention. The failure to perceive a stimulus despite its foveal presentation 
due to lack of attention is the essence of the IB phenomenon. Considering the convincing 
prior evidence indicating that detection and identification of the critical item in the IB 
paradigm are strongly influenced by its meaningfulness (Mack & Rock, 1998, Mack, 
2003), the IB paradigm provides a potentially useful vehicle for assessing attentional 
biases in social anxiety and psychopathology in general. This is particularly true for 

























hypervigilance may play a central role. Since attentional hypervigilance can be 
operationalized as the perception of a critical item despite attention being directed 
elsewhere, the IB paradigm provides a more “pure” measure of attentional hypervigilance 
compared to indirect measures such as reaction times from the Stroop or Dot-Probe task.  
The present study examined two primary performance indices derived from the IB 
paradigm (i.e., detection and identification rates). Identification rates provided support for 
the hypothesized three-way interaction. Specifically, under the bogus speech 
manipulation, HSAs were more than twice as likely to identify the frowning face relative 
to LSAs (61.9% vs. 26.1%). In contrast, LSAs were more likely to identify the happy 
face relative to HSAs (60.0% vs. 40.0%), The critical item by social anxiety status 
interaction was observed only from those who underwent the anxiety-induction 
manipulation. The influence of general emotional distress or gender did not affect these 
findings. 
Contrary to the findings for identification rates, detection rates were not influenced 
by participants’ social anxiety status, although the trend was consistent with the predicted 
direction in the presence of the bogus-speech manipulation. The discrepancy in findings 
surrounding detection vs. identification may be a function of the deeper level of 
attentional processing required for identification. One possibility is that the relatively 
shallow attentional processing may be enough for the low-level physical features to 
capture attention (i.e., detection of its presence), and accordingly the impact of the 
current contextual cue (i.e., the imminent social threat) on the face’s signal value may 




is likely to require more extensive attentional processing, in which the impact of the 
contextual cue may be further influenced by participants’ dispositional social anxiety. 
Relative to detection, identification may require greater attentional resources leading to 
more extensive perceptual and semantic processing. Future research on the underlying 
mechanisms governing the detection and identification of emotional faces is needed. 
The present study presents a successful replication of the original study (Mack and 
Rock, 1998). Although the two studies differed in sample characteristics, LSAs in the no 
anxiety-induction condition in this study are likely most similar to the college student 
sample of the Mack and Rock (1998) study. For the inattentional trial, detection rates 
were 85%, 40%, and 15%, and identification rates were 75%, 25%, and 15%, for the 
happy face, frowning face, and circle, respectively. The pattern of differences across the 
three critical items was similar to those reported in the original Mack and Rock study. 
Experiment 1 also provides some possible explanation for what appeared to Mack and 
Rock as a puzzling finding in the context of their meaningfulness-signal hypothesis, 
namely the poorer detection and identification of frowning faces relative to happy faces. 
It is reasonable to assume that frowning faces are more likely to have greater signal value 
to those displaying heightened social anxiety either due to a dispositional tendency or 
through an experimental manipulation. 
Overall, the present study contributes to the existing literature demonstrating that 
individuals with heightened social anxiety display attentional hypervigilance in response 
to socially threatening cues (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2002). In addition, a careful 




anxiety may be linked to the absence of positively oriented information processing as 
well as the presence of negative attentional bias. LSAs who received the social anxiety 
induction were more likely to identify the happy face compared to HSAs who also 
received the social anxiety induction. LSAs also exhibited a superior identification of the 
happy face over the frowning face. These findings suggest that relative to HSAs, LSAs 
are more likely to engage in preferential attentional processing for the happy face. 
This study also suggests the possibility that LSAs may be characterized by a 
positively biased perceptual compensation in the event of forming an imperfect 
perceptual representation. When exposed to the social anxiety-induction, 76.2% of the 
HSAs (16 out of 21) detected the frowning face. Of the 16 detectors, 81.3% (N=13) 
correctly identified it. In contrast, 69.6% (16 out of 23) of the LSAs detected the 
frowning face, but only 37.5% (N=6) of the 16 detectors correctly identified it. 
Interestingly, of the 10 LSAs who detected but failed to identify the frowning face, 9 
(spontaneously) reported having seen a happy face and also selected a happy face out of 
the object array during the recognition test (one person reported having seen a circle). 
Perhaps LSAs compensate for their incomplete percept with some positively oriented 
top-down encoding process. It is believed that that the greater misidentification of the 
frowning face observed for LSAs reflects a perceptual failure caused by insufficient 
attentional engagement rather than an interpretation bias. Once attention was sufficiently 
engaged in the frowning face, it was correctly identified by most of the LSAs receiving 
the social anxiety-induction manipulation (i.e., identifiers among the detectors – 80.9% 




together, LSAs are more likely to display preferential attentional processing towards a 
happy face, whereas HSAs are more likely to display hypervigilant attentional processing 
towards an angry face. 
Interestingly, significant gender differences were observed from the inattentional 
trial, suggesting that males are likely to outperform females in detecting or identifying the 
happy face, but not the frowning face or the circle. In contrast, there was a non-
significant trend for females to outperform males in identifying the frowning face. These 
gender differences cannot be explained by social anxiety, trait anxiety, or depression. It 
may be that relative to females, males are inherently predisposed to engage in a deeper 
attentional processing of positive rather than negative emotional cues. MacLeod (1991) 
concluded that there is no gender difference in emotional Stroop interference. Overall, 
evidence for gender differences in attentional biases linked to anxiety disorders is scarce. 
In fact, many studies investigating attentional biases in anxiety disorders seem to have 
paid little attention on gender differences, as indicated by Osorio and colleagues (2003). 
Future research needs to directly address potential gender differences in attentional 
processing.  
Additional analyses on the accuracy of cross-line discrimination shed light on the 
utility of the IB task as a sensitive attentional measure. The pattern of cross-line 
discriminations across the 9 trials showed a consistent pattern of reduced accuracy 
corresponding to trials in which the critical item appeared. For those who failed to detect 
or identify the critical item, accuracy gradually improved across trials 1 through 4, 




drop in accuracy on trial 4 (i.e., inattentional trial), suggesting a vigilant attentional 
deployment towards the critical item and a consequent loss of accuracy on cross-line 
discrimination. On trial 5 and 6, all participants showed lower levels of accuracy 
compared to those attained in earlier trials, suggesting that the critical trial probing 
procedure increased participants’ attention to the potential emergence of an extra item on 
the display. On trial 7, they seemed to have discontinued the unsuccessful search for an 
extra object and instead reengaged their full attention to the cross, resulting in a sudden 
increase in accuracy. However, on trial 8 (i.e., divided attentional trial) the accuracy level 
noticeably dropped again only for detectors and identifiers with the presentation of the 
critical item. Again, on trial 9, all participants showed a noticeable drop in accuracy due 
to the presentation of the critical item in the preceding critical trial. Taken together, these 
data suggest that the covariation between cross-line discrimination accuracy and 
presentation of the critical stimulus might serve as an independent index of attentional 
vigilance. Unlike the Stroop and dot-probe tasks, the IB paradigm provides the 
opportunity to distinguish between the interference (i.e., attentional allocation) towards 
the primary task and attentional vigilance towards the threat stimuli. Future research 
should include a control group that undergoes only regular discrimination trials in order 
to directly test the effect of the presence vs. absence of the critical item.  
One might argue that the self-report based on an object array presenting 
emotionally valenced items might have introduced a response bias during the 
identification stage. In this study, identification rates were computed excluding those who 




still possible that the selection of the critical item from the object array was differentially 
affected by the level of social anxiety. In other words, relative to LSAs, HSAs might have 
preferred to select the frowning face and vice versa for the happy face. To examine this 
issue, two additional analyses were performed. First, the guesswork on the object array of 
non-detectors (i.e., those who were unable to detect the critical item) was compared 
according to the level of social anxiety. Of the 70 LSA non-detectors, 22 selected the 
happy face and 4 selected the frowning face. Similarly, of the 66 HSA non-detectors, 21 
selected the happy face and 4 selected the frowning face. Overall, these findings indicate 
that while participants displayed a pattern of guessing towards the more familiar object 
(i.e., happy face), their selection of emotional faces did not differ as a function of the 
level of participants’ social anxiety. Secondly, the object-array selection of those who 
detected the neutral critical item (i.e., circle) was also examined. Of the 11 LSA detectors 
of the circle, 7 selected the circle, 3 selected the happy face, and 1 selected the frowning 
face. Of the 10 HSA detectors, 8 selected the circle, and 2 selected the happy face. Taken 
together, the pattern of these findings is not consistent with a response bias account. 
Some limitations of the present study should be noted. First, social cues were 
conveyed via schematic facial icons as opposed to real facial pictures. Moreover, the 
emotional valence of the “frowning” face was not specific, although it surely conveyed 
some negative emotional expression. Because this was the first attempt to apply the IB 
paradigm to the area of psychopathology, it was important to retain the original stimulus 
parameters used in the static IB experiments. Moreover, the use of the schematic versions 




expressionless neutral face, thereby balancing their perceptual salience and removing a 
potential happy-face advantage (see Leppänen & Hietanen, 2004). Nonetheless, future 
investigations of attentional biases using this paradigm might consider the use of real 
facial pictures (e.g., Ekman’s emotional faces) to enhance the ecological validity of the 
findings. Another factor limiting the generalizability of the findings is the use of a college 
student sample. An analogue approach was taken because the completely crossed 
between-subject design of the IB paradigm required a large number of subjects. However, 
the FNES has been extensively used in analogue studies of SAD with its validity in this 
context well demonstrated (for a review, see Stopa & Clark, 2001). Particularly, it was 
found that the differences observed between high and low scorers on the FNES mirror 
those observed between social phobics and non-anxious controls. Nonetheless, it is 
important to replicate the present study with a clinical sample of social phobics.  
In summary, Experiment 1 suggests that the IB paradigm is a promising approach 
for investigating attentional biases in social anxiety. Its sensitivity in capturing attentional 
vigilance at an early processing stage while eliminating irrelevant response factors makes 
the IB task a useful addition to existing paradigms for assessing biased attention in social 




CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENT 2 – AN INVESTIGATION 
USING THE SUSTAINED IB PARADIGM 
 
 Despite its success in investigating the properties of stimuli that efficiently attract 
attention, the short stimulus presentation inherent in the static IB paradigm has raised 
concerns. For instance, Wolfe (1999) has put forward the possibility that IB may not 
reflect a perceptual failure caused by a lack of attention, but rather a memory failure 
resulting from instantaneous forgetting of the detected object. Studies using a rapid 
stimulus presentation method have shown that rapidly presented pictures may be 
identified within 125ms, but the consolidation into explicit memory may require 
approximately 300ms (Potter, 1975, 1976; Potter & Levy, 1969). Thus, the possibility 
that instantaneous forgetting is operating in the static IB paradigm cannot be completely 
ruled out. Relatedly, Most and colleagues (2001) have suggested that the short stimulus 
duration of the static IB makes the testing situation far removed from the full range of 
dynamic and sustained images that we face in our day-to-day lives. 
 Experiment 2 was conducted using the sustained IB paradigm developed by Most 
and colleagues (2001). Compared to the static IB task used in Experiment 1, the sustained 
IB task designed for Experiment 2 presents several methodological advances. First, it 
effectively excludes the inattentional amnesia account because the subject is exposed to 
the critical item for 5 sec. Second, the dynamic and sustained visual stimuli better 
emulate visual reality. Third, in an additional effort to enhance the ecological validity of 




conveyed by the social threat cue, which is a more social anxiety-relevant emotion 
compared to the rather ambiguous emotion delivered by the frowning facial icon. 
 Like Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was conducted using an analogue college 
student sample displaying high vs. low social anxiety as measured by the FNES. HSAs 
and LSAs were randomly assigned to one of three sustained IB conditions presenting a 
happy face, an angry face, or an oval in the presence or absence of the same bogus-
speech social anxiety induction manipulation employed in Experiment 1. 
As reviewed in Chapter 4, the primary determinant of attentional capture in the 
sustained IB paradigm is the perceptual match between the critical item and the 
perceiver’s attentional set (Most et al., 2005). In the context of social anxiety, HSAs are 
more likely to maintain or readily activate a hypervigilant attentional set attuned to 
negative social cues, relative to LSAs (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Accordingly, 
Experiment 2 was devoted to testing the hypothesis that HSAs would show a 
significantly higher detection/identification rate of the angry face relative to LSAs; LSAs 
would show a significantly higher detection/identification rate of the happy face relative 
to HSAs; and that these hypothesized differences in detection/identification rates would 
be present only for participants assigned to the social anxiety induction condition. Thus, 
identical to those of Experiment 1, Experiment 2 tested the same set of hypotheses, 
including a three-way interaction between social anxiety status (high vs. low), social 
anxiety induction manipulation (present or absent), and critical item condition (i.e., happy 
face, frowning face, or circle). No significant interaction effects were expected with 




were significant effects expected with respect to detection/identification of the non-social 
critical item (i.e., oval). 
5.1. Participants 
 Undergraduate students (N=2350) enrolled in introductory psychology courses at 
the University of Texas at Austin were screened using the FNES. Those who scored 10 or 
below (LSAs; N=714) or 22 or higher (HSAs; N=693) were invited to participate in the 
experiment in partial fulfillment of their experimental credit. Of those, 305 students 
replied to the invitation. Upon retesting, 45 participants no longer met the FNES criteria. 
The final sample consisted of 261 students (97 males, 164 females, mean age = 18.82 
years, SD = 1.66). They were ethnically diverse: Caucasian (58.2%), Hispanic (21.1%), 
Asian/Pacific Islander (11.5%), African American (5.4%) and other (3.4%). 
5.2. Materials 
The present IB task was designed following the typical structure of sustained IB 
tasks (Most et al., 2001; Most et al., 2005). Subjects were seated at a comfortable 
distance from a 17 inch computer monitor (on average, about 35cm). The task was 
composed of five 15-second judgment trials, which took place on a 13cm by 18cm gray 
display with a small fixation cross at the center. On each trial, four black squares and four 
light gray ovals moved on (predetermined) haphazard paths at a variable speed ranging 
from 2 to 5 cm/sec, occasionally occluding each other or bouncing off the edges of the 
display. Approximately, these objects had a height and width of 1 cm. In a pilot study, 
this set of stimuli along with the critical item described below was found to present a 




On each trial, subjects were asked to fixate on the central cue and keep track of the 
number of times the four black squares bounce off the edges. The first two trials were 
regular judgment trials. The third, fourth, and the fifth and last trial corresponded to the 
inattentional, divided attention, and full attention condition, respectively. Five seconds 
into each of the critical trials, the critical item entered the middle of the right side of the 
display and moved and exited to the left side of the screen during the next five second 
period (See Figure 6). Critical items included a happy face, an angry face, and a light 
gray oval. They were in the shape of an oval with the same size and overall luminance. In 
order to reduce any potential gender bias of the emotional critical items, one male and 
one female face from Ekman’s facial stimuli (Ekman, 1976; Ekman & Friesen, 1984) 
were averaged using image-morphing software (Morpheus Photo Morpher v3.00).  
 
 




In the inattentional and divided attention trials, the regular judgment of the number 
of bounces was followed by additional probing questions and a recognition (or guess) test 
based on an object array (See Figures 7) in the same fashion with Experiment 1. In the 
full attention condition, they were asked to simply watch the display without counting the 
bounces made by the squares.  
 
 
Figure 7. The object array for the recognition test in the sustained IB task 
 
5.3. Experiment Design  
A 2 x 3 x 2 completely crossed factorial design was used to investigate the effects 
of participants’ social anxiety status (high vs. low), critical item condition (happy face, 
angry face, and circle), and the presence or absence of a bogus speech anxiety induction 
task on detection/identification rates using the IB paradigm. HSAs and LSAs were each 
randomized to one of six experimental conditions: (a) Angry face – Social Anxiety 
Induction, (b) Angry face – No Social Anxiety Induction; (c) Happy face – Social 
Anxiety Induction, (d) Happy face – No Social Anxiety Induction; (e) Oval – Social 
Anxiety Induction, (f) Oval – No Social Anxiety Induction. Participants’ 




trials:  Trial 3 (Inattention trial), Trial 4 (Divided Attention Trial), and Trial 5 (Full 
Attention Trial). 
5.4. Measures 
The FNES was used as a pre-screening instrument with the cutoff scores of “22 or 
higher” and “10 or below” for recruiting HSAs and LSAs, respectively.  
A battery of social anxiety measures was administered prior to the IB task, which 
included the FNES, SIAS, and the SPS. General emotional distress was measured by the 
STAI-T and the BDI. The author-constructed mood checklist consisting of 8 emotional 
adjectives was administered to generate the manipulation check for the bogus-speech 
manipulation. 
5.5. Procedure 
The experimenter met with each participant in the laboratory and provided an 
explanation about the study. Subjects were briefly told that the study was designed to 
examine the nature of social discomfort and that the procedure would involve a packet of 
questionnaires, a short computer task, (and a videotaped speech task in the case of 
subjects who were assigned to the social anxiety induction condition). After obtaining 
informed written consent, the questionnaire battery was administered. Upon its 
completion, those assigned to the social anxiety induction condition received an 
additional instruction, “As written in the consent form, you will be asked to prepare and 
give a 3-minute videotaped speech in front of a panel of three speech evaluators. They 
will evaluate your speech in terms of appearance, speech content, vocalization, 




with a list of speech topics from which you can choose to speak about, and you will be 
left alone for 3 minutes to prepare your speech”. The subject was then given a list of 12 
controversial speech topics (e.g., abortion, seatbelt regulation laws, gay marriage, war in 
Iraq, etc.) and spent three minutes preparing for the speech on the selected topic.  After 
the three minutes, the experimenter came back with a video camera and said “The 
preparation time is over. This video camera will be used to record your speech. Now 
before starting the speech task, you need to carry out a computer task as part of the pre-
assessment”. The mood checklist was administered again before the IB computer task 
began. Participants who did not undergo the social anxiety induction manipulation were 
given instead a three-minute break after completing the questionnaire battery. 
Following the three minute period, the sustained IB task was introduced to the 
subject. According to the assigned condition, one of three IB tasks was executed 
presenting a happy face, an angry face, or an oval as the critical item. Throughout the IB 
task, the experimenter stayed at a distance of 1.5 meters from the subject and remained 
silent except in the three critical trials, in which they guided the subject through each 
additional probing step (i.e., asking the subject to elaborate the detected item and 
recognize/guess the item from the object array). 
5.6. Data Analyses 
Experiment 2 used the same analytic techniques as those used in Experiment 1. 
Two primary indices were (a) the proportion of participants who detected the critical item 
in the inattentional trial and (b) the proportion of participants who identified the critical 




correctly identified the critical item. Hierarchical logistic regression analyses were 
performed to examine the singular and interactive effects of each of the three independent 
variables (i.e., social anxiety status, critical item condition, and social anxiety-induction 
manipulation) on the binary outcomes of detection and identification in the inattentional 
trial. The same analytic procedure was applied to detection and correct identification 
rates of the divided and full attentional trials. 
5.7. Statistical Power to Detect Differences in Detection/Identification Rates 
Power analyses were conducted in the same fashion as Experiment 1. The 
statistical power to detect a medium effect size in the hypothesized direction with the 
current sample size and setting a at .05 (one-tailed) was .73. 
5.8. Results 
5.8.1. Group Characteristics 
 Table 7 presents means and standard deviations of the demographic and clinical 
measures across the 12 experimental conditions. Compared with LSAs, HSAs consisted 
of more females (70% vs. 56%), χ2(1) = 5.25, p = .022. HSAs also scored significantly 
higher than LSAs on the FNES (mean = 25.89 vs. 5.15), t(259) = 63.34, p < .001; SPS 
(mean = 27.16 vs. 8.28), t(259) = 16.25, p < .001; SIAS (mean = 35.53 vs. 13.86), t(259) 
= 17.81; p < .001; BDI (mean = 10.90 vs. 3.38), t(259) = 10.47, p < .001; and STAI-trait 
(mean = 48.57 vs. 34.00), t(259) = 17.18, p < .001. There were no significant differences 
in the demographic and clinical measures between the two social anxiety induction 
conditions or the three critical item conditions. Overall, the randomization was successful 




5.8.2. Social Anxiety Induction Manipulation Check  
 The effectiveness of the social anxiety induction manipulation was assessed by 
comparing the pre- and post manipulation anxiety index computed from the Mood 
Checklist for participants in the two social anxiety induction conditions. The two groups 
did not differ significantly in their pre-manipulation state anxiety scores (social anxiety 
induction condition - mean = 30.39, SD = 18.70; no social anxiety induction condition - 
mean = 26.25, SD = 17.42; t(259) = 1.85, p = .066). Whereas, after the anxiety-induction 
manipulation, those who received the social anxiety induction manipulation reported 
significantly higher anxiety scores (mean = 40.30, SD = 24.28) compared to those who 
did not receive the social anxiety induction manipulation (mean = 22.72, SD = 16.51), 
t(259) = 6.86, p < .001. Moreover, there was a significant increase in pre- to post 
manipulation anxiety scores for those who received the social anxiety induction 
manipulation, t(127) = 7.64, p < .001. In contrast, there was a significant decrease in pre- 
to post manipulation anxiety scores for those who did not receive the social anxiety 
induction manipulation, t(132) = - 4.35, p < .001. Table 8 presents the means and 
standard deviations of pre- and post manipulation anxiety scores across the 12 
experimental groups. Overall, relative to LSAs, HSAs displayed a greater increase in the 
manipulation anxiety scores in response to the social anxiety induction manipulation. 
5.8.3. Differences in Detection Rates for the Inattentional Trial 
The three dichotomous independent variables were entered into a hierarchical 
logistic regression model to predict the binary outcome of detection performance in the 




critical item condition, and social anxiety-induction manipulation). In Step 2, the three 
two-way interaction terms formed by the cross-product of the three predictors were 
entered, and in Step 3, the three-way interaction term was entered.  
 Table 9 presents the detection rates across the 12 experimental groups. In Step 1, 
there was a main effect only for the critical item condition: (a) the happy face was 
detected better than the oval (58.0% vs. 3.4%), B = 3.68, Wald = 24.21, p < .001, odds 
ratio = 39.61, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) [9.15, 171.50]; and (b) the angry face was 
also detected better than the oval (58.8% vs. 3.4%), B = 3.72, Wald = 24.71, p < .001, 
odds ratio = 41.08, 95% CI [9.49, 177.79]. In Step 2, none of the two-way interaction 
terms were significant. In Step 3, the three-way interaction term involving the contrast 
between the happy and angry faces was statistically significant above and beyond the 
main effects of the three individual predictors and their two-way interactions, B = 2.53, 
Wald = 4.71, p = .030, odds ratio = 12.59, 95% CI [1.28, 123.85]. To further probe this 
three-way interaction, the two-way critical item by social anxiety status interaction was 
examined for each level of the social anxiety induction condition. Results revealed a 
significant critical item (happy vs. angry face) by social anxiety status interaction only for 
those who underwent the social anxiety-induction manipulation, B = 1.71, Wald = 4.09, p 
= .043, odds ratio = 5.54, 95% CI [1.06, 29.09].  Further analyses revealed a non-
significant trend under the social anxiety-induction manipulation that HSAs 
outperformed LSAs in detecting the angry face (72.0% vs. 54.2%), Fisher’s exact test, p 
= .159, whereas LSAs outperformed HSAs in detecting the happy face (66.7% vs. 




induction manipulation, there was a non-significant trend that compared to HSAs, LSAs 
detected the angry face better (63.0% vs. 46.2%), Fisher’s exact test, p = .170.  
The nature of the observed three-way interaction was also examined by comparing 
the happy vs. frowning face conditions separately for LSAs and HSAs. In the presence of 
social-anxiety induction manipulation, HSAs detected the angry face significantly better 
than the happy face (72.0% vs. 44.0%), Fisher’s exact test, p = .042. In contrast, in the 
absence of social-anxiety induction manipulation, there was a non-significant reverse 
trend for HSAs to detect the happy face better than the angry face (62.5% vs. 46.2%), 
Fisher’s exact test, p = .191. Figure 8 presents the detection rates in the inattentional trial 
across the 12 experiment groups. 
5.8.4. Differences in Identification Rates for the Inattentional Trial 
An identical analytic approach used for the analyses of detection rates was applied 
to the binary outcome of identification in the inattentional trial. Step 1 revealed a 
significant main effect for the critical item condition indicating: (a) the happy face was 
identified better than the oval (51.0% vs. 3.4%), B = 3.40, Wald = 20.73, p < .001, odds 
ratio = 30.06, 95% CI [6.95, 130.10], and (b) the angry face was also identified better 
than the oval (45.5% vs. 3.4%), B = 3.16, Wald = 17.92, p < .001, odds ratio = 23.63, 
95% CI [5.46, 102.19]. In Step 2, none of the two-way interaction terms were significant. 
In Step 3, the three-way interaction term involving the contrast between the happy and 
angry faces was marginally significant, B = 2.06, Wald = 3.19, p = .074, odds ratio = 
7.85, 95% CI [.82, 75.50]. To further probe this non-significant trend of three-way 




examined for each level of the social anxiety induction condition. Results revealed a 
significant critical item (happy vs. angry face) by social anxiety status interaction only for 
those who underwent the social anxiety-induction manipulation, B = 2.04, Wald = 5.87, p 
= .015, odds ratio = 7.69, 95% CI [1.48, 40.07].  Further analyses revealed that under the 
social anxiety-induction manipulation, HSAs outperformed LSAs in identifying the angry 
face (64.0% vs. 29.2%), Fisher’s exact test, p = .015. In contrast, there was a non-
significant reverse trend for LSAs to outperform HSAs in identifying the happy face 
(58.3% vs. 44.0%), Fisher’s exact test, p = .237.  In the absence of the social anxiety-
induction manipulation, HSAs and LSAs did not differ in identifying the faces. 
This marginally significant three-way interaction was also examined by comparing 
the happy vs. angry face conditions separately for LSAs and HSAs. LSAs who underwent 
the social anxiety-induction manipulation identified the happy face significantly better 
than the angry face (58.3% vs. 29.2%), Fisher’s exact test, p = .040. In contrast, there was 
a non-significant trend for HSAs to identify the angry face better than the happy face 
(64.0% vs. 44.0%), Fisher’s exact test, p = .128. No significant difference in the 
identification rates between the happy face vs. angry face was observed for both LSAs 
and HSAs assigned to the no social anxiety-induction condition (LSAs – 48.1% vs. 
40.7%, Fisher’s exact test, p = .392; HSAs –54.2% vs. 46.2%, Fisher’s exact test, p = 





5.8.5. Controlling for Gender and General Emotional Distress 
 HSA and LSA participants differed significantly with respect to gender. Thus, we 
repeated the logistic hierarchical regression analyses using gender as a covariate in Step 1 
for the detection and identification rates from the inattentional trial. We also entered the 
BDI and STAI-trait in Step 1 to examine the possibility that the observed interaction 
effects were accounted for by general emotional distress. Results revealed that neither 
gender nor general emotional distress was predictive of the detection rates. After 
controlling for the three covariates, the observed social anxiety by critical item by social 
anxiety induction three-way interaction remained significant, B = 2.82, Wald = 5.59, p = 
.018, odds ratio = 16.77, 95% CI [1.62, 173.57].   
In the case of the identification rates from the inattentional trial, none of the three 
covariates significantly contributed to the model; and after controlling for the three 
covariates, the social anxiety by critical item by social anxiety induction three-way 
interaction was significant, B = 2.36, Wald = 3.99, p = .046, odds ratio = 10.57, 95% CI 
[1.05, 106.81].  
I also considered the possibility that the observed group differences may be due to 
differential perceptual accuracy or attentional investment by examining bounces-counting 
errors across the 12 experiment groups. The counting error for each trial was determined 
by taking the absolute number of difference between the reported number of bounces and 
the correct number of bounces made by the four black squares. The overall counting error 
for the entire sample was 2.01 (SD = 1.16) and there were no significant differences 




5.8.6. Differences in Detection and Identification Rates for the Divided and Full-
Attention Trials 
Table 9 presents the detection and identification rates from the divided and full 
attentional trials. Although our primary interest was in examining the detection and 
identification rates in the inattentional trial, we repeated the analyses reported above for 
the data derived from the divided and full attentional trials. Consistent with prediction, 
once participants expected the emergence of the critical item (i.e., divided attentional 
trial) the significant three-way interactions observed in the inattentional trial were no 
longer present. However, the critical item main effect for the detection rates was still 
significant indicating that the happy face was detected better than the oval (89.0% vs. 
27.1%), B = 3.09, Wald = 50.46, p < .001, odds ratio = 22.04, 95% CI [9.39, 51.74], and 
the angry face was detected better than the oval (92.2% vs. 27.1%), B = 3.47, Wald = 
53.82, p < .001, odds ratio = 32.00, 95% CI [12.68, 80.76]. The critical item main effect 
for the identification rates was also significant indicating that the happy face was 
identified better than the angry face (84.0% vs. 71.6%), B = .73, Wald = 4.43, p = .035, 
odds ratio = 2.09, 95% CI [1.05, 4.15], or the oval (84.0% vs. 28.8%), B = 2.56, Wald = 
41.78, p < .001, odds ratio = 12.98, 95% CI [5.97, 28.24].  
As expected, once participants were instructed to attend fully to the emergence of 
the critical item (i.e., full attentional trial), detection and identification rates were 
uniformly high with no significant main or interaction effects of participants’ social 





5.8.7. Gender Differences in Detection and Identification Rates 
Although the observed interaction effects remained unaffected after controlling for 
the influence of gender, we conducted another set of hierarchical logistic regression 
analyses to further examine the role of gender and its possible interaction with the three 
IVs (i.e., critical item, social anxiety status, and social anxiety-induction) in predicting 
the detection and identification rates from the three critical trials. However, results 
revealed no main or interactive effects for gender. 
5.8.8. Additional Evidence of Vigilant Attention towards the Critical Item 
 Finally, we conducted additional analyses to further examine the evidence 
of attentional vigilance towards the critical items. If the critical item attracted the 
viewer’s attention, one would expect a reduction in the attentional resources available for 
the black square-bounces counting task, thereby leading to greater counting errors among 
those who detected or identified the critical item. The counting error from each trial was 
compared between detectors and non-detectors (also between identifiers and non-
identifiers) determined based on the inattentional trial (i.e., #3). Consistent with 
expectation, detectors and non-detectors did not differ in counting errors on the first two 
regular trials (trial #1 mean error = 3.08 vs. 2.84, t(259) = .837, p=.403; trial #2 mean 
error = 1.40 vs. 1.31, t(259) = .565, p = .573). In contrast, relative to non-detectors, 
detectors showed significantly greater errors on the third (inattentional) trial (mean error 
= 2.38 vs. 1.77; t(259) = 2.84, p = .005).  The same pattern of findings was observed for 




response rates between detectors (identifiers) and non-detectors (non-identifiers) across 






Table 7. Experimental group characteristics in Experiment 2 
 No Bogus Speech Manipulation Bogus Speech Manipulation 



















































Age 18.37 18.83 19.48 18.69 18.93 18.71 19.13 18.80 18.42 18.44 19.40 18.80 
 (0.74) (1.46) (3.48) (1.19) (1.10) (0.73) (2.07) (1.61) (0.65) (0.71) (1.55) (1.52) 
Gender 
(% Male) 44% 25% 44% 35% 40% 29% 46% 28% 46% 32% 40% 33% 
FNES 5.48 25.71 5.26 26.65 5.33 24.57 4.88 25.96 4.42 25.88 5.80 26.00 
 (2.12) (1.63) (2.94) (2.65) (3.42) (2.59) (2.53) (2.91) (2.87) (1.97) (3.53) (2.80) 
SPS 8.59 25.54 9.48 27.96 7.40 24.50 8.04 27.68 6.29 26.64 10.00 30.80 
 (5.44) (11.84) (7.73) (10.52) (6.80) (9.59) (5.57) (11.06) (4.46) (10.03) (10.80) (16.67) 
SIAS 14.30 34.13 14.44 36.62 13.67 29.29 13.71 39.44 10.92 34.36 17.13 37.13 
 (5.72) (10.35) (8.97) (13.26) (7.79) (9.50) (5.84) (11.01) (4.84) (11.13) (12.03) (13.35) 
BDI 2.78 9.42 3.74 13.27 4.13 7.14 3.17 12.04 2.25 9.32 5.20 13.40 
 (3.03) (4.83) (4.18) (7.38) (6.82) (5.08) (2.51) (9.15) (2.25) (5.83) (4.96) (8.54) 
STAI 32.85 48.83 34.81 51.46 31.47 44.14 34.75 48.04 33.67 48.32 36.47 48.53 




Table 8. Pre- and Post manipulation anxiety scores across the 12 experiment groups in Experiment 2 
 No Bogus Speech Manipulation Bogus Speech Manipulation 



















































Pre 19.93 30.67 18.00 37.74 18.13 34.14 24.08 43.36 17.75 33.84 22.00 41.67 
(11.50) (18.19) (10.97) (20.23) (14.19) (17.91) (15.81) (18.81) (9.86) (16.49) (17.20) (18.90) 
Post 14.81 26.75 15.41 36.08 12.81 31.00 29.62 52.32 23.67 47.92 28.13 63.47 





Table 9. Detection and Identification Rates of the Three Critical Trials across the 12 Experiment Groups in Experiment 2 
 
 
No Bogus Speech Manipulation Bogus Speech Manipulation 
 



























   Detection Rate (%) 59.3 62.5 63.0 46.2 0.0 7.1 66.7 44.0 54.2 72.0 6.7 0.0 
   Identification Rate (%) 48.1 54.2 40.7 46.2 0.0 7.1 58.3 44.0 29.2 64.0 6.7 0.0 
Divided Attention  
   Detection Rate (%) 
88.9 83.3 92.6 92.3 26.7 35.7 95.8 88.0 83.3 100.0 26.7 26.7 
   Identification Rate (%) 81.5 75.0 85.2 73.1 26.7 35.7 91.7 88.0 54.2 72.0 26.7 26.7 
Full Attention 
   Detection Rate (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 93.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 95.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   Identification Rate (%) 100.0 100.0 96.3 100.0 93.3 100.0 95.8 96.0 95.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 












































Table 10. Counting errors a across trials in Experiment 2 
 
a Counting errors were defined as the difference between the reported number of bounces 
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M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Trial 1 3.08 (2.39) 2.84 (2.36) 3.18 (2.44) 2.81 (2.32) 
Trial 2 1.40 (1.29) 1.31 (1.22) 1.38 (1.35) 1.33 (1.19) 
Trial 3 
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Figure 9. Identification Rates in the Inattentional Trial (Experiment 2) 
 
5.9. Discussion 
This is the first study to apply the sustained IB paradigm to the field of anxiety 
disorders specifically or psychopathology more generally. Several experiments conducted 
by Most and colleagues (2005, 2001) have consistently demonstrated the dominant role 
of the viewer’s attentional set in leading the unexpected critical item to capture attention 
in the sustained IB paradigm. They reached the conclusion that although some bottom-up 
stimulus properties such as salience could affect the detection of critical items, the most 
powerful mediator is the attentional set adopted by the individual (Most et al., 2005).  
In line with the attentional set hypothesis, this study predicted that relative to 
























show a preferential processing of the happy face, in the presence of the bogus-speech 
manipulation. This prediction hinged on the assumption that HSAs would be more apt to 
activate an attentional set attuned to negative social cues particularly when expecting a 
social-evaluative event. Consistent with prediction, relative to LSAs, HSAs were more 
likely to detect and identify the angry face; whereas relative to HSAs, LSAs were more 
likely to detect and identify the happy face, in the presence of the bogus speech anxiety 
induction manipulation. These findings were not accounted for by general emotional 
distress or demographic variables such as age or gender. The possibility that the observed 
group differences may be due to differential perceptual accuracy was also examined. 
However, the overall degree of counting errors made on the primary task did not differ 
across the experiment groups. Moreover, when detectors and non-detectors from the 
inattentional trial were compared with respect to their pre-critical trial performance (# 1 
and #2), no significant difference emerged in counting errors. It indicates that varying 
detection and identification rates are not attributable to differential perceptual accuracy or 
attentional investment to the primary counting task. 
 Several aspects of Experiment 2 data are consistent with the attentional set 
hypothesis as opposed to the stimuli-salience account. Compared to the distracter stimuli 
(i.e., 4 black squares and 4 gray ovals), the emotional faces used in Experiment 2 
contained several salient physical features such as unique surfaces, gradations, 
protrusions, internal facial components, as well as a unique motion path. However, the 
happy face and the angry face shared most of these physical features except the emotional 




detection of critical items, HSAs and LSAs should not have differed in 
detecting/identifying the emotional faces. Thus, these findings are suggestive of the 
operation of some top-down process that tuned the viewer’s attentional set to a certain 
kind of stimuli above and beyond the attentional benefit of physical salience. Moreover, 
similar to findings based on the static IB paradigm in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 also 
showed a stark contrast in detection and identification rates for social critical items vs. 
non-social critical items. In the inattentional trial, the (critical-item) oval went almost 
completely undetected, whereas the overall detection and identification rates for the 
happy and angry faces were 58.0% and 58.8%, respectively. From the standpoint of the 
attentional set hypothesis, one would easily explicate these data. First, the critical-item 
oval was very similar to the distracter ovals randomly moving on the display, although it 
was still visually distinguished from the four distracter ovals due to its coarser contour 
and the uniquely straight motion path. Considering the explicit instructions that led 
subjects to disregard ovals while keeping track of squares, the zero-level detection rates 
for the oval stand to reason. The previous study (Most et al., 2005) also reported that the 
detection rate was virtually zero when the critical item was identical to the ignored 
distracter items of the induced attentional set. Second, in Experiment 2, the bogus-speech 
anxiety induction procedure was another key ingredient intended to affect the viewer’s 
attentional set. In contrast with emotional faces, the gray oval was very unlikely to gain 
any attentional benefit from the induced attentional set or heighten social anxiety. 
The bogus-speech manipulation seemed to play an important role in amplifying 




may be that the bogus-speech manipulation activated the subjects’ cognitive schema 
related to social-evaluative situations, and thus making the socially threatening or 
positive cues a particularly relevant dimension in their attentional set as a function of 
levels of their dispositional social anxiety. In the absence of the bogus-speech 
manipulation, there was a tendency for HSAs to detect the happy face better than the 
angry face (62.5% vs. 46.2%), which seems to suggest the possibility for HSAs to display 
attentional avoidance from the negative social cue. However, once the bogus-speech 
manipulation was administered, the angry face was detected significantly better than the 
happy face by HSAs (72% vs. 44%). In the case of LSAs, they showed equivalent 
detection rates between the happy and angry faces in the absence of the bogus-speech 
manipulation. However, in the presence of the bogus-speech manipulation, there was a 
non-significant trend for LSAs to detect the happy face better than the angry face (66.7% 
vs. 44.0%).  
 Interestingly, similar to findings from Experiment 1, there was a noticeable drop 
in the identification rate of LSAs presented with the angry face. In the presence of the 
bogus-speech manipulation, only 54% of the LSA detectors from the inattentional trial 
correctly identified the angry face, whereas 89% of the HAS detectors identified the 
angry face. Unlike Experiment 1, this tendency was observed in LSAs without regards to 
the presence of the bogus-speech manipulation procedure. One speculation is that LSAs’ 
dispositionally low social anxiety rendered their attentional set attuned to more positive 
or benign social cues and thus preventing them from allocating sufficient attention to the 




analyses revealed that among the entire non-detectors in the inattentional trial, HSAs and 
LSAs did not differ in guessing the critical item from the object array (of 66 LSA non-
detectors, 5 chose the happy face and 1 selected the angry face; of 68 HAS non-detectors, 
4 chose the happy face and 2 selected the angry face). These data suggest that the LSAs’ 
pattern of misidentifying the angry face was not likely to be confounded by a response 
bias that would have led individuals to preferentially process the positive vs. negative 
social cue according to the level of their social anxiety. 
 Taken together, the present data may contribute to the literature indicating the 
operation of attentional hypervigilance in social anxiety. The present study also 
demonstrated the promising utility of the sustained IB task in investigating attentional 
biases in social anxiety, particularly due to several methodological strengths: (a) 
preclusion of potential response factors, (b) use of emotional faces as the main search 
target, and (c) delivery of the emotional cue tapping the core of social anxiety. Moreover, 
unlike other cognitive experiments addressing millisecond matters such as the emotional 
Stroop or dot-probe task, this version of the sustained IB task found the evidence of 
attentional hypervigilance in a more realistic testing situation that examined how the 
individual indeed processed an unexpected social cue lasting over a 5-second period 
while engaging in a judgment task. The naturalistic viewing conditions may contribute to 
enhancing the ecological validity of the findings. Similar to the static IB task, the 
sustained IB task also presents a secondary measure of attentional allocation via the 




attentional hypervigilance to the unexpected object was accompanied by a significant loss 
of accuracy on the primary task.  
 Some limitations of the study and considerations for future research are worthy of 
note. First, although subjects were instructed to focus on the central cue of the display 
throughout all trials, their adherence was not directly measured. I doubt this would affect 
the observed findings because each subject was exposed to the same five dynamic 
displays except the differing critical item. However, it is still worthwhile to examine 
whether a certain pattern of eye movement could affect the performance on this paradigm. 
Secondly, the nonclinical nature of the current data limits the generalizability of findings. 
Replication with a clinical sample of social phobics is needed. Thirdly, one might argue 
that the object array containing emotionally-valenced items could introduce a response 
bias in the recognition test of critical trials. However, this is unlikely given that non-
detector HSAs and LSAs did not show any preferential selection towards a particular 
emotional face in the recognition test. Had a response bias operated in the object-array 
recognition test, choices of the emotional faces would have differed as a function of the 
level of social anxiety. Nonetheless, future research may include additional items to the 
object array such as a neutral face to lower any chance of response biases. Moreover, the 
neutral face may be used for constituting another critical item condition to enhance the 
interpretability of data. A neutral face would provide baseline levels of detection and 
identification rates to be compared with those from emotional faces. For instance, with 




condition would help quantify the magnitude of advantage/disadvantage in attention 







CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
6.1. Inattentional Blindness in Clinical Reality 
Jack is a 25-yr old graduate student who had suffered severe social anxiety 
problems for more than 10 years. He just started giving a research presentation on 
cognitive experimental paradigms in front of his peers and departmental faculty when his 
heart started pounding painfully. He could hardly step aside the podium for fear of 
revealing his trembling hands and legs. He could also sense a film of perspiration on his 
forehead. His research addressed several complicated issues, which made the presentation 
a very cognitively-demanding task. The audience started displaying a wide range of 
unexpected reactions. Some were smiling, nodding, leaning forward, or taking notes. 
Others suddenly stood up and left the room. Some others were yawning or making a 
grimace. In the middle of this demanding task, Jack’s attention automatically shifted to 
the audience, but he was unaware of the varied reactions of his audience. Rather, he 
suddenly noticed his research advisor giving a heavy yawn and making a face sitting in 
the corner of the room. When it occurred, he thought to himself, ‘That just means my 
performance is so poor and a way below his expectations. That exactly matches what I 
was afraid to see.’  To make matters worse, several of his friends in the audience taunted 
him by asking irrelevant questions, pretending to request a behavioral demonstration of 
his findings: “The two young men sitting in the front row just left the room. The one who 
kept yawning left a sheet of paper on the chair. Did you notice where it was? Tell me the 




row, there are people smiling, dozing off, or just listening. Name the color of their hair 
very quickly.” ……  
 
 The cost of failing to see an unexpected object could be enormous in reality. As 
noted by Most et al. (2005), many traffic accidents seem to be accounted for by drivers’ 
obvious failure to detect obstacles placed in front of their eyes despite no factors 
hindering their vision. Conversely, some clinical conditions such as anxiety disorders are 
characterized by superior detection of potentially threatening cues. This seems 
particularly true in the case of social anxiety disorder, in which attentional hypervigilance 
is considered to play a central role in its maintenance (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
The present dissertation study presents data from two independent experiments 
conducted with nonclinical college student samples using the static and sustained IB tasks 
in order to investigate attentional biases in social anxiety. Overall findings from both 
Experiment 1 and 2 indicate that in response to a social evaluative event, HSAs are more 
likely to display hypervigilant attentional processing towards negative social cues, 
whereas LSAs are more likely to display preferential attentional processing towards 
positive social cues. Considering the clinical relevance of the IB paradigm (as illustrated 
in the case vignette presented earlier), as well as its several methodological strengths 
including the preclusion of response biases, the current data (a) present a robust 
demonstration of attentional hypervigilance implicated in social anxiety, and (b) provide 
evidence supporting the utility of this paradigm as an attentional bias measure for social 




support the cognitive model of social anxiety (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) suggesting that 
social phobics display vigilant response to potential social threats.  
6.2. A Model of Attentional Processing for the IB paradigm 
 There is one intriguing question arising specifically from the IB testing situations. 
How come the individual fails to see the emotional face if he/she has already checked its 
meaning (in the case of the static IB paradigm) or compared its properties against his/her 
own attentional set (in the case of the sustained IB paradigm)? This question would 
remain as an inextricable tangle if the operation of implicit attentional processing is not 
taken into consideration. One of the previous sustained IB experiments that included a 
control condition in which subjects were presented with no critical item in the 
inattentional trial (Most et al., 2005) revealed that the emergence of the critical item led 
to a significant reduction in counting accuracy even for non-detectors, although the 
greatest decrease was observed among detectors. These findings led Most et al. (2005) to 
suggest that an implicit shift of attention may precede the awareness of an unexpected 
object appearing during an attentionally-demanding task, although it does not guarantee 
the conscious experience of the critical item unless one’s attentional set matches the 
critical item.  
Based on the current data and the original work done by Mack and Rock (1998) 
and Most et al., (2005; 2001), a 2-stage attentional processing model is postulated for the 
IB paradigm (particularly with respect to the inattention trial), including (a) implicit, 
transient, and automatic attentional processing, and (b) extended attentional processing. 




mediating role in determining whether the unexpected item receives further attentional 
resources in the extended attentional processing stage on the basis of the implicitly 
processed stimulus features. In the case of the static IB task, based on the implicitly 
gleaned stimulus features, the top-down process would determine whether or not the 
threshold for meaningfulness has been reached. Likewise, in the case of the sustained IB 
paradigm, this top-down process would examine the implicitly gleaned stimulus features 
to determine whether the unexpected object presents a good match in comparison with 
one’s own attentional set. Once implicitly processed stimulus input passes through this 
top-down mechanism, it would receive extended attentional processing. 
The entirety of perceptual representation of the stimulus input would depend on 
the extent to which attentional resources are allocated to the extended attentional 
processing stage. Thus, an unexpected object receiving a sufficient amount of extended 
attentional processing is likely to be both detected and identified. In contrast, an object 
receiving a limited amount of further attentional resources may end up with a partial 
perceptual representation that could be misidentified despite the threshold for detection 
being already met. This seems to provide a reasonable account for the tendency observed 
in both Experiment 1 and 2 that relative to HSAs, LSAs was more likely to misidentify 
the negative face following the detection of its unexpected emergence. Finally, some 
bottom-up stimulus features (e.g., salience) may also contribute to the detection of the 
unexpected object by bypassing the top-down filtering/matching mechanism (See Figure 




One line of research has investigated two types of attentional processing using the 
spatial cueing paradigm developed by Posner and colleagues (Posner, 1980; Posner et al., 
1980): endogenous attention vs. exogenous attention (e.g., Prinzmetal, McCool, & Park, 
2005; Prinzmetal, Park, & Garrett, 2005). Several classification schemes corresponding 
to this attention taxonomy have been put forth: voluntary vs. involuntary attention, goal-
directed attention vs. stimulus-driven capture, controlled vs. automatic attention, push vs. 
pull attention, channel enhancement vs. channel selection (e.g., Wundt, 1902; Jonides, 
1976, 1980; Posner, 1980; Klein & Shore, 2000; Prinzmetal et al., 2005). According to 
Prinzmetal et al., (2005), endogenous attention is voluntary and strategic, is deployed to 
the location that may contain goal-directed information (i.e., working with informative 
cues indicating the target location), and purposes to enhance perceptual representation 
(i.e., channel enhancement for a veridical perceptual representation). In contrast, 
exogenous attention is involuntary and stimulus-driven, works when cues are not 
informative (i.e., invalid cues), affects a non-perceptual serial selection 
mechanism/decision process (i.e., channel selection for the rapid decision of a relevant 
response channel). However, the endogenous-exogenous taxonomy does not map on to 
the two attentional processing stages proposed in this chapter primarily because (a) the 
critical factor to operationally classify the endogenous-exogenous attention is based on 
the validity of preceding cues that do not exist in the IB paradigm, and (b) the intention to 
search the display for the target operates in both endogenous and exogenous attention. 
Particularly, the IB paradigm was designed to eliminate the strategic, voluntary, and 




proposed IB attentional processing model seems similar to exogenous attention, given its 
transient and stimulus-driven characteristics. Moreover, in line with the nature of implicit 
attentional processing in the proposed model, it was suggested that exogenous shifts of 


















Figure 10. Attentional Processing Model of the Static IB Paradigm 
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The proposed IB attentional processing model seems also in accordance with 
Posner’s (1980) distinction between orienting and detecting. He suggested that allocating 
attentional resources to the target signal (i.e., orienting) is a pre-requisite for becoming 
aware of the signal (i.e., detection). In the proposed IB model, the “orienting process” 
would be assessed by examining whether the unexpected item successfully elicited 
sustained attentional processing (i.e., success or failure of detection), and the “detecting 
process” would be evaluated by examining the quality of perceptual representation 
manifested in two different levels: detection with identification, or 
misidentification/detection failure (i.e., identification rates). 
Based on the proposed 2-stage attentional processing model, the current findings 
may be rephrased more specifically as follows: 
(1) Relative to LSAs, HSAs are more likely to sustain the implicitly shifted attention  
towards potentially negative (as opposed to positive) social cues (i.e., Hypervigilant 
Attentional Orienting). This implicates that social phobics may be quicker in attending to 
potentially threatening cues emerging in social situations even with limited attentional 
resources, compared to individuals low in social anxiety. 
(2) Relative to LSAs, HSAs are more likely to allocate greater attentional resources 
towards potentially negative (as opposed to positive) social cues following an automatic 
attentional shift to them, which would lead to a more veridical perceptual representation 
of the social cues and a greater hindrance to the ongoing task performance (i.e., Deeper 
Attentional Processing Leading to Better Detection). This implicates that social phobics 




more clearly at early stages of information processing, compared to individuals low in 















Figure 11. Attentional Processing Model of the Sustained IB Paradigm 
 
 
Unlike the IB paradigm, investigations of biased attentional processing using the 
modified dot-probe paradigm seems to tap into only a limited facet of attentional 
processing. Namely, it only measures the orientation of relatively early (typically 500ms, 
but Cooper and Langton (2006) argued this is not early enough) attentional deployment 
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forced between two paired stimuli, without accounting for how the social cue itself was 
attentionally processed. Paired stimuli also make it difficult to infer underlying response 
mechanisms in the dot-probe paradigm leading to varying detection speed (i.e., one 
attracting attention, another inhibiting attention, or both?). The emotional Stroop task is 
activating exogenous attention that affects the selection between two competing channels 
(i.e., words vs. color) according to Printzmetal et al. (2005). However, as reviewed earlier, 
this task appears plagued with numerous potential response bias factors that could affect 
the channel selection process, thus rendering it a questionable measure of attentional bias. 
In contrast, the IB task as an attention-bias measure is capable of assessing multifaceted 
or sequential aspects of attentional processing, yielding more informative indices of 
attentional bias, compensating for limitations of existing cognitive experiments. 
Consequently, the IB paradigm may provide a more purely attentional processing index 
by assessing how extensively the social cue itself was processed while precluding the 
influence of potential strategies or intention to search. From a clinical vantage point, 
hypervigilant attention may be important in social anxiety to the extent that the social cue 
is followed by negatively-biased extended cognitive processing (e.g., negatively biased 
perceptions, interpretations, retrieval of memories, etc.).  
6.3. Static vs. Dynamic Critical Items 
 
 In the present study, both experiments yielded consistent results despite the 
considerable methodological variations within the IB paradigm. Although the 
hypothesized three-way interaction of social anxiety status by critical item by bogus-




Experiment 1, the observed trend under the bogus-speech manipulation was similar to 
that of Experiment 2.  
There are several differences between the two IB tasks worth noting. The most 
distinctive parameter is the duration of the critical items. Compared to the static IB task, 
which presents a static critical item for 200ms, the sustained dynamic IB task presents a 
moving critical item over a 5-sec period during the course of a 15-sec judgment trial. As 
mentioned earlier, this prolonged duration effectively excludes the possibility of 
inattentional amnesia causing the IB phenomenon. For the memory-failure account to 
hold, there should exist a reasonable explanation about some top-down process that could 
prevent even the presence of the detected item from being consolidated into an explicit 
memory for 5 sec (Most et al., 2005). 
Second, Experiment 1 used schematic facial icons either smiling vs. frowning, 
whereas Experiment 2 used Ekman’s facial pictures expressing happiness vs. anger. The 
use of less potent schematic icons conveying less social anxiety-relevant emotion might 
have attenuated attentional bias in Experiment 1. A static IB task presenting relevant 
emotional faces may attain greater sensitive to detect attentional bias in social anxiety. 
Third, unlike the static IB task, the sustained IB task leaves room for eye-
movement. Future study may include an eye-tracking device to examine (a) subjects’ 
adherence to instructions, (b) potential additive evidence of attention bias derived from 
eye-movements in conjunction with the processing of critical items, and (c) the 
relationship between eye-movements and performance on the IB task. Prinzmetal et al., 




Taken together, eye-tracking may constitute a particularly useful addition to the sustained 
IB paradigm.  
6.4. The Role of Bogus-Speech Manipulation in Attentional Bias Investigation 
 Both Experiment 1 and 2 revealed a different pattern of interaction between social 
anxiety status and critical-item condition according to the presence of absence of the 
bogus-speech manipulation procedure. What is the exact role of the bogus-speech anxiety 
induction manipulation in attentional bias investigation? Generally, it has been regarded 
as an experimental procedure to temporarily heighten (state) social anxiety. Accordingly, 
most studies (e.g., Sposari & Rapee, 2007; Mansell et al., 1999), including the present 
study, checked the success of bogus-speech manipulation by assessing the levels of state 
anxiety before and after the manipulation procedure.  
 Findings using existing experiment paradigms such as the Stroop and the dot-
probe are equivocal concerning the effects of speech threat: the suppression of Stroop 
interference observed with a speech threat (Amir et al., 1996), attentional avoidance from 
faces observed with a speech threat (Mansell et al., 1999), attentional avoidance from 
faces observed without any social threat (Chen et al., 2002), and attentional 
hypervigilance observed with a speech threat (Sposari & Rapee, 2007). Particularly, Chen 
et al., (2002) found attentional avoidance from faces using a clinical sample in a modified 
dot-probe task without a bogus-speech manipulation. Thus, they argued that bogus-
speech manipulation is not necessary with clinical samples of SAD patients due to their 
already heightened sensitivity to social evaluation. However, Sposari and Rapee (2007) 




task, and found a greater vigilance for faces in patients with SAD, relative to normal 
controls. Thus, it appears that the presence of speech threat does affect attentional 
processing without regard to the clinical status of subjects. This also suggests the 
possibility that the primary role of bogus-speech manipulation may not be a (state) social 
anxiety enhancer.  
 Another, perhaps more important, role of the bogus-speech manipulation may be 
to activate a cognitive schema related to social-evaluative situations. Cognitive models of 
social anxiety posit the strong effects of negative social beliefs originating from early 
experience (i.e., schema) on biased information processing of social cues (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997; Clark & Wells, 1995). Schemas are deep mental structures serving as a 
cognitive framework to organize and process information (Bartlett, 1932; 1958; Mandler, 
1984; Rumelhart, 1980). This construct was developed in cognitive psychology and later 
applied to emotional disorders and personality disorders as vulnerability factors 
governing maladaptive and negatively biased processing of information about self, others, 
and the environment (e.g., Beck et al., 1979, Young, 1990). Particularly, a maladaptive 
social schema may lead the individual to selectively attend to negative social cues or 
misinterpret the meaning of ambiguous or neutral social cues in a way confirming the 
negative schema. In both Experiment 1 and 2, identification rates from the inattentional 
trial showed the tendency that the preferential processing for the happy face in the case of 
LSAs, and the angry face in the case of HSAs was more prominent when the speech 
threat was introduced. It may be that the bogus-speech task helped amplify underlying 




situation. HSAs’ schema may be replete with themes centering around embarrassment, 
shame, awkwardness, and so forth; whereas that of LSAs may suggest that pleasant social 
interactions and favorable social feedback are likely to occur.  (Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Thus, a bogus-speech task is expected to exert differential 
influence on attentional processing as a function of the level of dispositional social 
anxiety. Particularly, in the context of investigating attentional bias in social anxiety, the 
attentional set in the sustained IB task may be strongly affected by underlying cognitive 
schemas guiding selective encoding of information related to social-evaluative situations. 
Future studies need to attempt to assess the activation of schema related to social-
evaluative situations as a manipulation check for the bogus-speech task to examine this 
hypothesis. 
6.5. Conclusions 
Understanding the characteristics and underlying mechanisms of biased 
attentional processing in psychopathological conditions may contribute to elaborating 
cognitive accounts of their maintenance, which often serve to guide the development of 
specific treatment strategies. The present study demonstrated the IB paradigm’s 
promising utility as a vehicle for investigating attentional bias in social anxiety and 
perhaps other psychopathological conditions. Particularly, the IB paradigm enables 
multiple aspects of attentional processing (e.g., orienting and detecting) to be examined 
while controlling for potential response bias factors. However, it is noteworthy that the 
IB experiment may need to be implemented inevitably relying on a completely-crossed 




limits the examination of attentional bias within the intra-individual level. Nevertheless, 
the IB paradigm offers several methodological advantages that would compensate for 
limitations of existing cognitive experimental paradigms. It would be worthwhile to 
pursue clinical replication, including different diagnostic groups of anxiety disorders. 
This would help establish the specificity of current findings as well as examine its utility 
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